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The Rationality of Preference Construction (and the 
Irrationality of Rational Choice)
Claire A. Hill
“The meaning of  preference . . .  may be illustrated by 
this well-known exchange among three baseball umpires.  ‘I  
call them as I see them,’ said the first.  ‘I call them as they 
are,’ claimed the second. The third disagreed, ‘[t]hey ain’t 
nothing till I call them.’”1
1. INTRODUCTION
Economists  traditionally  assume  that  preferences  are 
fixed.2  But, as a recent paper noted, “[t]his assumption has 
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1
. Paul  Slovic,  The Construction of  Preferences, 50  AM.  PSYCHOL. 364, 
364  (1995)  (quoting  Amos  Tversky  &  Richard  Thaler,  Anomalies:  
Preference Reversals, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 201, 210 (1990)).  Jerome Bruner also 
recounts this story.  See  Jerome Bruner,  What is a Narrative Fact?,  560 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 17, 19–20 (1998).
2
2
. See C. CHRISTIAN VON WEIZSÄCKER,  PREPRINTS OF THE MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR 
RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE GOODS, THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF ADAPTIVE PREFERENCES 2 
(2005),  http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2005_  11online.pdf   (“Traditional 
neo-classical economics has worked with the assumption that preferences 
of agents in the economy are fixed.”);  see also GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC 
APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5 (1976);  Samuel  Bowles,  Endogenous 
Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic 
Institutions,  36  J.  ECON.  LITERATURE 75,  75  (1998)  (“Markets  and  other 
economic institutions do more than allocate goods and services: they also 
influence the evolution of values, tastes and personalities. Economists have 
long assumed otherwise; the axiom of exogenous preferences is as old as 
liberal  political  philosophy  itself.”);  Matthew  Rabin, Psychology  and 
Economics, 36 J.  ECON. LITERATURE 11, 11 (1998).  For the purposes of this 
article,  the terms  “exogenous preferences” and  “fixed preferences” can 
fairly  be  treated  as  synonymous.  See  Brett  McDonnell,  Endogenous 
Preferences and Welfare Evaluations, in NORMS AND VALUES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 
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always  been  disputed  and,  indeed,  in  the  social  sciences 
outside of neoclassical economics the assumption has never 
been accepted by anyone. Modern economics . . . has raised 
addition-al  doubts  about  the  realism  of  this  behavioural 
assumption.”3  Indeed, preference construction is a hot topic 
in  many  fields,  the  behavioral  sciences  generally  and 
psychology most significantly.4  And it has also long been an 
important topic in philosophy.5
The  manner  by  which  preferences  are  constructed  is 
(Aristides Hatzis, ed., forthcoming).  Traditional law and economics scholars 
generally  assume  preferences  are  fixed,  given  that  their  underlying 
assumptions are those of economics.  See, e.g.,  Ian Ayres,  Symposium: 
Homo  Economicus,  Homo  Myopicus,  and  the  Law  and  Economics  of 
Consumer Choice:  Menus Matter, 73  U. CHI. L.  REV.  3, 11 (2006);  Russell 
Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 
608, 623–25 (1998).
3
3
. WEIZSÄCKER, supra note 2, at 2; see, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR 
TASTES 18–23 (1996) (noting that while economists treat preferences using 
the traditional model, preferences need to be viewed as endogenous); LOUIS 
KAPLOW &  STEVEN SHAVELL,  FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 411  n.30  (2002)  (citing  to 
materials  that  “mov[e]  from  the  idea  that  individuals  may  learn 
probabilities—information—over time to the idea that individuals may learn 
about their own utility functions over time . . . and . . . discussing changes 
in tastes and imperfect information about future preferences.”); Dan Ariely 
et  al.,  Coherent  Arbitrariness:  Stable  Demand  Curves  Without  Stable 
Preferences, 118 Q. J. ECON. 73, 73–75 (2003) [hereinafter Ariely, Coherent 
Arbitrariness]; Dan Ariely et al., Tom Sawyer and the Construction of Value, 
60  J.  ECON.  BEHAV.  &  ORG.  1,  2 (2006)  [hereinafter  Ariely,  Tom Sawyer]; 
Bowles,  supra  note  2,  at  76  (“One  risks  banality,  not  controversy,  in 
suggesting  that . . .  allocation  rules . . .  influence  the  process  of  human 
development, affecting personality, habits, tastes, identities and values.”); 
Gregory W. Fischer et al.,  Goal-based Construction of  Preferences:  Task 
Goals  and  the  Prominence  Effect, 45  MGMT.  SCI.  1057,  1058  (1999); 
Korobkin,  supra note  2, at 675 (“[T]he preference exogeneity argument, 
implicit in all law and economics theories of efficient contract default rule 
selection, is probably false . . . .”); McDonnell, supra note 2, at 6.
[T]he  economist’s  assumption  of  exogenous  preferences  is 
false for a large and important set of  circumstances . . .  few 
would deny [this].  Even some of those economists who insist 
most strongly on the exogenous preference assumption grant 
that  it  is  factually  false,  and  importantly  so.   Indeed,  a  co-
author  of  the  leading  article  arguing  for  the  exogeneity 
assumption, Gary Becker, went on to develop theories in which 
preferences are in some sense endogenous . . . even Richard 
Posner, the leading exponent of law and economics, grants that 
sometimes the law affects preferences.
Id.;  see  also John  W.  Payne et  al.,  Measuring  Constructed  Preferences: 
Towards a Building Code, 19 J.  RISK & UNCERTAINTY 243,  245 (1999).   The 
authors  also  discuss  how  legal  rules  can  affect  preferences.   KAPLOW & 
SHAVELL,  supra  at  413–18;  see  also Drew Fudenberg,  Advancing  Beyond 
“Advances in Behavioral Economics”, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 694 (2006); Jörg 
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necessarily  of  significant  interest  for  law.6  Consider  the 
extensive  resources  devoted  to  state-sponsored  or  state-
certified education as well as public-awareness and public-
interest  campaigns.   Consider,  too,  the many instances in 
which  the  public  (or  some  subset’s)  preference  supports 
action.  That preferences are constructed suggests that the 
process by which they are elicited matters—people do not 
simply have preferences that are invariant to the mode of 
elicitation, a point made forcefully by Paul Slovic7 and others, 
and borne out by extensive research.  One finding of obvious 
importance: Group deliberation, as occurs when juries make 
decisions,  can  yield  different  results  than  individual 
deliberation.8
It  is  therefore  not  surprising  that  law  and  economics 
scholars,  especially  those  within  behavioral  law  and 
economics, 9 increasingly acknowledge that preferences are 
often constructed,10 consider what legal contexts preference 
Rieskamp  et  al.,  Extending  the  Bounds  of  Rationality:  Evidence  and 
Theories of Preferential Choice, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 631 (2006).
4
4
. See THE CONSTRUCTION OF PREFERENCE (Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic 
eds., 2006).  The law and sociology scholar Lauren B. Edelman notes that 
“[i]n  contrast  to the fixed and stable  preferences  that  determine social 
behavior in L&E [Law and Economics], L&S [Law and Society] sees social 
action as responsive to institutions, norms and historical context.” Lauren 
B.  Edelman,  Rivers  of  Law  and  Contested  Terrain:  A  Law  and  Society 
Approach to Economic Rationality, 38 LAW & SOC. REV. 181, 187 (2004).
5
5
. One of the earliest discussions of the topic is in ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN 
ETHICS.  See infra note 100.
6
6
. See  BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 2  (Cass  R.  Sunstein  ed.,  2000) 
(regarding  the  importance  of  preference  construction  for  law);  Bowles, 
supra note 2, at 75; McDonnell, supra note 2, at 7.
7
7
. Slovic, supra note 1, at 364.
8
8
. An  extensive  literature  exists.   One  recent  example  is  David 
Schkade et al.,  What Happened on Deliberation Day?, 95  CAL. L. REV. 915 
(2007).
9
9
. See, e.g., Korobkin,  supra note  2, at 675.   See generally BEHAVIORAL 
LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 6, at 1.
Human preferences and values are constructed rather than elicited 
by social situations . . . . Human beings do not generally consult a 
freestanding ‘preference menu’ from which selections are made at 
the moment of choice; preferences can be a product of procedure, 
description and context at the time of choice.
Id.
10
1
. See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 6, at 1–2.
[P]references  can  be  a  product  of  procedure,  description  and 
context at the time of choice: “Alternative descriptions of the same 
choice  problems  lead  to  systematically  different  preferences; 
strategically equivalent elicitation procedures give rise to different 
choices; and the preference between x and y often depends on the 
choice set within which they are embedded.”
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construction might matter in, and how it might matter.11  In 
particular,  law  and  economics  scholars  are  increasingly 
noting that law itself is a mechanism by which preferences 
are constructed.12
For  the  most  part,  the  critique  focuses  on  the 
economists’  positive claim that  preferences are fixed.  But 
the  economists’  claim  is  not  just  positive—it  is  also 
normative.  Preferences that are not as economists posit are 
not infrequently, and perhaps even typically,  characterized 
as  “irrational.”  Behavioral  law  and  economics  scholars 
Id. (quoting Amos Tversky, Rational Theory and Constructive Choice, in THE 
RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 185 (Kenneth  J.  Arrow et  al.  eds., 
1996)).   This  point  is  especially  important  for  law.  The  legal  system is 
“pervasively in the business of constructing procedures, descriptions and 
contexts  for  choice.”  Id. at  2;  see  also KAPLOW &  SHAVELL,  supra  note  3 
(expressing the concern that a society or lawmaker’s view of what others 
prefer (or ‘should’ prefer) will be imposed on people on the rationale that it 
would be good if people did not like such things); Neal Katyal, Deterrence’s 
Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2461 (1997) (arguing that preferences are 
not  exogenous  and  that  legal  systems  can  shape  tastes,  and  that 
preference formation and substitution can be examined using psychology 
and cognitive bias); Tracey L. Meares et al., Symposium: Punishment and 
Its  Purposes,  Updating The Study Of Punishment,  56  STAN.  L.  REV. 1171, 
1180 (2004) (noting that “[t]raditional understandings of deterrence ignore 
a wealth of research from psychology about the way in which people frame 
choices,” giving  as  an  example  a  circumstance  in  which  people  might 
choose A over B, but if C is also offered, people might be more apt to pick B 
over A); Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 411, 421 
(2006).   Interestingly,  Richard  Posner  himself,  someone  staunchly 
antipaternalistic,  has  used  reasoning  that  smacks  of  what  Kaplow  and 
Shavell  object  to.   For  example, see  Morin  Building  Products  Co.  v.  
Baystone Construction, Inc., 717 F.2d. 413, 417 (7th Cir. 1983), in which 
Posner concludes that the parties probably did not intend to subject one 
party’s obligation to the other party’s  “aesthetic  whim” notwithstanding 
language in the contract that says they did.  Posner apparently reasoned 
that where the obligation at issue was one which parties  ought to deem 
was not subject to “aesthetic whim,” that in this case it also was not.  All 
this being said, some scholarship arguably makes too much of preference 
construction.  In this article, I argue for a more nuanced approach.
11
1
. One legal scholar who has written extensively about the issue is 
Cass Sunstein.  See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 6, at 1–2; 
Cass R. Sunstein,  Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL 
STUD.  217 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein,  Endogenous Preferences]; Cass R. 
Sunstein,  How  Law  Constructs  Preferences,  86  GEO.  L.J. 2637,  2638 
(1998);Symposium,  Preferences  and  Rational  Choice:  New  Perspectives 
and Legal Implications, 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 707 (2003).  He and some other 
scholars  now  argue  that  the  law  should  “nudge”  people  toward  more 
desirable behavior and preferences.  The theory underlying this approach is 
more formally called libertarian, or soft, paternalism.  See generally RICHARD 
H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008).
12 . See, e.g., Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 11, at 220; 
SUNSTEIN & THALER,  supra note  11;  KAPLOW & SHAVELL,  supra note  3 (discussing 
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sympathetic  to  constructed  preferences  often  implicitly 
accept this normative position,13 especially insofar as they 
characterize some preference construction as anomalous or 
a mistake.  Consider some of the paradigmatic  examples, 
such as one in which a treatment is alternately presented as 
curing 80% of people or as failing to cure 20% of people; 
Smith favors the first treatment over the (identical) second 
treatment.14  Here,  “irrationality”  seems  like  a  fair 
assessment.   Indeed,  Smith  may  very  well  have  more 
difficulties  in  life  than  will  his  doppelganger,  who 
various mechanisms by which law might affect preferences).
The  suggestion  is  often  made  that,  if  the  law  symbolically 
announces some preferences or reinforces others by appearing to 
embody certain viewpoints, individuals will come to adopt different 
preferences and, in turn, to behave differently.  For example, social 
norms—which,  as  we  discuss  in  [another  section],  influence 
individuals’  behavior  and tend to have the character of  tastes—
may be influenced by whether  they are reinforced or in tension 
with prevailing legal rules.
Id. at 415.  Kaplow and Shavell  also discuss views about other types of 
situations in which law might change preferences, including that “laws may 
directly change people’s experiences, which in turn can influence people’s 
preferences and behavior and . . .  that the process of  considering which 
laws to adopt may itself affect preferences.”  Id.  See also BEHAVIORAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS,  supra note  6,  at  2  (“[L]aw  can  construct  rather  than  elicit 
preferences internally, by affecting what goes on in court, and externally, 
by  affecting  what  happens  in  ordinary  transactions,  market  and 
nonmarket.”);  Korobkin,  supra  note  2,  at 611 (“My thesis  is  that  when 
lawmakers anoint a contract term the default, the substantive preferences 
of contracting parties shift—that term becomes more desirable, and other 
competing terms become less  desirable.”).  A  related  and more  general 
point has been made: that a default option is often seen as endorsed by 
those offering the option.  See note 125, infra.  See also McDonnell, supra 
note 2.
It  may  well  be  that  for  many  of  the  traditional  problems  that 
economists think about, the exogenous preference assumption is 
not  too  far  wrong.   However,  the  assumption  becomes  more 
dubious in the domain of law and economics.  The most obvious 
concern  is  the  effect  of  laws  on  social  norms,  a  topic  much 
discussed over the last decade or so.
Id. at 6.
13
1
. I do not want to say they always accept the position.  My point here 
is simply that the bulk of the scholarship expressly disputes the positive, 
descriptive claim. Sometimes, the evidence used against the positive claim 
is characterized as a normative failing; other times, normative concerns 
are  simply  not  addressed.   See Bruce  Chapman,  Rational  Choice  and 
Categorical Reason, 151  U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 1170 (2003) (“[T]he general 
tenor  of  [studies  showing  that  rational  choice  theory  is  descriptively 
incorrect] is not to question the normative ideal of maximization.  Rather, 
the departures from the standard account of rational choice are typically 
characterized, and criticized, as failures to be rational.”).  A standard line of 
argument is  (a)  economists  assume preferences are fixed;  (b)  they are 
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understands  the  equivalence  of  these  two  options.15  But 
preference construction is not simply a caricatured and more 
general version of this type of framing, where two identical 
options  are  assessed  differently.16  This  type  of  mistake, 
however  common,  is  fairly  characterized  as  irrational;17 
preference construction more broadly is not.
My article argues that preference construction, properly 
understood,  is  not normatively  undesirable.   Having  fixed 
preferences  means  having  a  complete  and  stable  rank 
ordering of what we want that dictates our choices.  But we 
often  do  not  have  such  an  ordering18—and,  I  will  argue, 
rationally so.  I am not the first to make the argument that 
the rational  choice model’s  normative  claims are not  well 
grounded.19 But much of the work thus far simply notes that 
there is  nothing to support  the model’s  normative  claims, 
especially given its descriptive failings: the model is not true 
and  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  it  would  be.   I  argue 
instead for an alternative model, a process-based model of 
preference  construction.   Such  a  model  can  potentially 
explain  some  important  anomalies  that  violate  the 
wrong; (c) we need to take into account that experimental evidence shows 
preferences are constructed; and (d) here is a context in which preference 
construction matters in the following way.
14
1
. See Russell  B.  Korobkin  &  Thomas S.  Ulen,  Law and Behavioral  
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 
88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1102–03 (2000).
15 . That being said, an argument can be made for the value of having a 
more optimistic perspective.  I discuss this possibility in the next Section.
16 . See  Claire A. Hill,  Beyond Mistakes: The Next Wave of Behavioral  
Law and Economics, 29 QUEEN’S L. J. 563 (2004) (discussing the tendency 
of  behavioral  law  and  economics  to  cast  deviations  from the  orthodox 
rational  person  model  as  mistakes—mistakes  that  are  systematic  and 
persist, and are sometimes adaptive, but that are mistakes nonetheless).
17 . That  being  said,  many instances  involve  what  I  call  self-limiting 
irrationality. See infra notes 53–56 and the accompanying text.
18 . More precisely, we may have such an ordering at the moment at 
which we make a choice, but the ordering is with respect to the particular 
context; the ordering will almost certainly change.  This kind of ordering is 
consistent with rational choice theory but if we only have orderings at the 
time of choice, the theory is almost a tautology and largely useless.
19 . The best argument for the rational choice theory’s normative claims 
is the Dutch-book/money-pump argument.  I discuss at length in notes 49–
56,  infra and accompanying text, why the Dutch-book argument does not 
suffice  as  a  normative  grounding  for  the  rational  choice  theory.   For 
criticisms of the economists’ normative position, see Rabin, supra note 2 , 
at 41 and Rieskamp et al., supra note 3, at 631. See also Chapman, supra 
note  13, at 1170; B. A. Mellers et al.,  Judgment and Decision Making, 49 
ANN.  REV.  PSYCHOL.  447,  450  (1998)  (noting  the  increasing  discussion  of 
alternatives to the rational choice model).
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traditional model.20
My account of preference construction is very much in 
the spirit of “reason-based choice,” as articulated by Eldar 
Shafir,  Itamar  Simonson  and  Amos  Tverksy,21 and 
“categorical reason,” as articulated by Bruce Chapman,22 as 
well  as  Itzhak Gilboa and David  Schmeidler’s  “case-based 
decision  theory”23 and  Daniel  Keys  and  Barry  Schwartz’s 
theory of “leaky rationality.” Keys’s and Schwartz’s  theory 
rejects  rationality  defined “formally”  in  favor  of  a broader 
account  that  “takes  subjective  experience  seriously, 
considers  both  direct  and  indirect  consequences  of 
decisions, and considers the effects of decisions on others.”24 
More broadly, my account is in the spirit of Herbert Simon’s 
attempts to shift economics from “substantive rationality” to 
“procedural  rationality.”25  Thus  far,  there  has  not  been 
20
2
. For  a  very  useful  discussion  of  anomalies  not  captured  by  the 
traditional  model,  see Arthur  Markman  &  Douglas  L.  Medin,  Decision 
Making, in MEMORY AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES 413, 413–66 (Hal Pashler et al. eds., 
3d ed. 2002); see also Chapman, supra note 13, at 1170; Eldar Shafir et al., 
Reason-Based Choice, in CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES 597 (Daniel Kahneman & 
Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
21 . Shafir et al., supra note 20.
22 . Chapman, supra note 13, at 1172; see also Viktor Vanberg, Rational 
Choice,  Rule-Following  and  Institutions:  An  Evolutionary  Perspective,  in 
RATIONALITY,  INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY 171–200  (Uskali  Maki  et  al. 
eds., 1993).
23 . Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler,  Case-Based Decision Theory, in 
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 659, 661 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004). 
Gilboa  and  Schmeidler  correctly  critique  expected  utility  models  on 
grounds that “in many decision problems, states of the world are neither 
naturally given, nor can they be simply formulated.   Furthermore, often 
even a comprehensive list of all possible outcomes is not readily available 
or easily imagined.” Id. at 659–60. But their alternative oversimplifies: they 
“suggest that people choose acts based on their performance in similar 
problems in the past.”  Id. “Similarity” determinations are not any more 
automatic than the determination of the possible choice set for a decision. 
The determination that A and B are similar could be otherwise depending 
on  the  same  sorts  of  factors  I  will  discuss  in  the  text  regarding  how 
narratives are formed.  Consider: similarity to what end?  My toaster and 
cranberry juice are both similar in being red.  Are they more similar to one 
another than my toaster is to my food processor?
24 . Daniel J. Keys & Barry Schwartz, “Leaky” Rationality: How Research 
on  Behavioral  Decision  Making  Challenges  Normative  Standards  on 
Rationality, 2 PERSP. PSYCH. SCI. 162, 162 (2007).
25 . See,  e.g.,  Herbert  Simon, From  Substantive  to  Procedural  
Rationality,  in PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMIC THEORY 65–86  (Frank  Hahn  &  Martin 
Hollis  eds.,  1979).  Note  that  Keys  &  Schwartz,  supra note  24,  speak 
approving of “substantive rationality.” However, they are using the terms 
differently than Simon does.   “Formal” rationality,  in Keys & Schwartz’s 
parlance,  is  the  same as  “substantive  rationality”  in  Simon’s  parlance. 
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much  elaboration  of  the  elements  of  a  process-based 
account of preferences.  I  hope in this article to make the 
case for such an account’s potential explanatory power, as 
well  as  its  tractability;  I  hope  as  well  to  suggest  some 
unifying themes for further exploration of the processes at 
issue.  One such theme is that of conservation of cognitive 
resources  or,  more  colloquially,  bang  for  the  buck.   The 
complete  and  stable  rank  orderings  hypothesized  by  the 
traditional model, even if they were possible, would entail a 
significant  and  unnecessary  expenditure  of  cognitive 
resources.
I  argue  that  rather  than  having  a  complete  rank 
ordering,  we  have ways  of  making  choices.  We  construct 
narratives,  using evaluative  criteria  against  a  backdrop of 
wants, desires and inclinations, some of which we rank order 
and some of which we do not.  The evaluative criteria embed 
a  consideration  of  transaction  costs:  critically,  where  a 
decision is not very consequential, a formulaic decision rule 
that  permits  a  ready  choice  among  roughly  comparable 
alternatives  may  serve  our  purposes  better  than  a  more 
considered  alternative-by-alternative  assessment.   Our 
wants,  desires  and  inclinations  are  for  both  traditional 
objects of choice and higher order values and desires; they 
are both previously constructed and constructed and elicited 
in the choice-making process.26 Our preferences are arrayed 
on  a  continuum.  At  one  end,  preferences  are  quite 
narratively independent, often involving unmediated drives 
and desires with very singular realizations, such as drinking 
liquid when one is thirsty; 27  at the other end, preferences 
What they mean by “substantive rationality” has significant overlap with 
what Simon means by “procedural rationality.”
26
2
. See Gilboa & Schmeidler, supra note 23, at 661 (“[E]xpected utility 
theory  does  not  describe  the way people “really”  think about  [decision 
making  under  uncertainty] . . . .  Correspondingly,  it  is  doubtful  that 
[expected utility theory] is the most useful tool for predicting behavior in 
applications  of  this  nature.   A  theory  that  will  provide  a  more  faithful 
description of how people think would have a better chance or predicting 
what they will do.”).
27 . Interestingly, Becker, supra note 3, notes that 
Much  of  modern  economics  still  proceeds  on  the  implicit 
assumption  that  the  main  determinants  of  preferences  are  the 
basic biological needs for food, drink, shelter and some recreation. 
That may not be a bad approach for the very poorest countries, 
where families spend over half their incomes on food and another 
quarter  on  shelter,  and  where  adult  males  manage  only  a  few 
hours of true leisure each week . . . . It should be obvious that basic 
needs for food, shelter and rest have little to do with the average 
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are  quite  narratively  dependent,  often  involving 
instantiations of higher-order preferences, such as choosing 
a  particular  career  for  its  prestige,  income,  and  other 
features.
This account of preference construction matters for legal 
scholarship in three ways.  First, it helps make the intuitive 
case that preference construction is not a simple mistake, 
heuristic,  or  bias  that  can  be  viewed  as  exceptional,  a 
deviation from the more general default of the neoclassical 
model.  To the contrary, preference construction is a rational 
way to conserve cognitive resources; preferences are made 
determinate  (only?)  as  needed.  None of  this  is  to  say,  of 
course, that we can never treat preferences as fixed; as I 
argued above, many preferences are fixed enough.  It is a 
safe bet, for instance, that most people will do a great deal 
to  avoid  going  to  jail.   Indeed,  an  important  part  of  the 
preference construction research agenda is to systematically 
determine when preference construction does not matter, or 
does not matter much.
Second,  it  suggests  some  unifying  principles  to  be 
considered in developing a process-based alternative to the 
present  model  of  preferences,  and  consistent  with  those 
principles,  some  possible  determinants  of  preferences. 
Critically, my account looks to cost-minimization: of a piece 
with our narratives are decision rules that aim importantly to 
minimize  costs  not  only  of  decision-making  but  also  of 
informing ourselves about, and categorizing, ourselves and 
the world.  While my work in this regard is necessarily very 
preliminary, I hope that it can suggest useful ways to explore 
the  determinants  of  preferences,  complementing  and 
making  use  of  the  extensive  work  now  being  done  by 
behavioral scientists in the area.  Consider in this regard my 
observations in the preceding paragraphs about narratively 
independent  preferences’  resistance  to  change  relative  to 
narratively dependent preferences.
Third,  my  account  of  preference  construction  furthers 
what I  have elsewhere characterized as the next  wave of 
behavioral law and economics—the search for more realism 
as to how people understand and make decisions, and how 
person’s  choice  of  consumption  and  other  activities  in  modern 
economies.
Id. at  3.  In  other  words,  the  preferences  I  characterize  as  narratively 
independent  are  the  paradigmatic  preferences  on  which  traditional 
economists base their theories.
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they perceive their own interests.28
The first wave of behavioral law and economics implicitly 
hypothesized  a  false  dichotomy:  people  either  come  to 
correct conclusions or make mistakes.  Indeed, the first wave 
typically  spoke of  preference construction as a mistake;  a 
paradigmatic example was of differing reactions to an 80% 
cure  rate  and  a  20%  failure  rate.   But  the  process  of 
preference construction is something other than a potential 
source of mistakes.  Preferences help us define who we are; 
as our preferences are constructed, we come to understand 
the world and ourselves.
The first wave also implicitly hypothesized another false 
dichotomy:  people  are  either  self-interested  or  altruistic. 
That  dichotomy  implicitly  characterizes  self-interest  as 
antithetical to others’ interests.  But preferences are not just 
for scarce objects of choice, where A’s acquisition of such an 
object (for instance, a raise from a limited bonus pool) might 
be at B’s expense. Indeed, they are often for higher-order 
values  and  ideals,  including  those  that  might  not be 
antithetical  to,  or  might  even  further,  others’  interests. 
Consider in this regard a preference for thinking one lives in 
a just world.29
More realism, by itself, might not be sufficient to justify 
my endeavor;  economists  typically  argue,  especially  when 
defending  unrealistic  assumptions,  that  what  matters  is 
predictive  power.   In  my  view,  a  richer  account  of 
28
2
. See Hill, supra note 16.
29 . Elaborating on the example,  I  may contribute time and effort  to 
secure the release of a prisoner wrongly convicted in remote country X; in 
large part, I may be motivated by wanting to believe I live in a just world 
where being innocent pays off.  I am therefore not being purely altruistic; 
indeed,  I  am  acting  very  much  in  accordance  with  my  self-interest. 
Believing that I live in a just world is an important part of my life, helping 
me  conclude  that  working  hard  and  generally  obeying  the  rules  is 
worthwhile.  But for the just world concern, I might not be motivated to act: 
Any instrumental motive for my behavior is obscure and remote at best. 
What is the chance that a good outcome for the prisoner will affect laws 
generally or in my country, will prevent the fomenting of unrest that could 
hurt me, or that the person, imprisoned unjustly for a number of years,  will 
leave jail angry and do damage that could hurt me? Presumably zero.  The 
just-world effect has been discussed in the literature, although in quite a 
different context: blaming a crime victim in order to sustain a belief in a 
just world.  See MELVIN J. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A FUNDAMENTAL DELUSION 
(1980); Claire Andre & Manuel Velasquez,  The Just World Theory, 3  ISSUES 
ETHICS  (1990),  available  at 
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/iie/v3n2/justworld.  html.   I  am 
presently  writing an article  entitled  “Rationality  in  an Unjust  World,”  in 
which I expand on some of the issues I discuss in this note.
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preferences  should  lead  to  more  explanatory  power—and 
better  predictions.   Ultimately,  my  hope  is  that  a  better 
understanding of the determinants of preferences can have 
a  significant  normative  payoff,  helping  inform  policy  and 
policymakers  as  to  how  best  to  influence  behavior.   My 
critiques and affirmative account here are a very preliminary 
step in that direction.
This article proceeds as follows.  Section 2 discusses the 
neoclassical  assumption  that  preferences  are  fixed, 
considering the positive and normative justifications for the 
assumption.   With  increasing  numbers  of  economists 
agreeing that, as a descriptive and positive matter, the fixed 
preferences assumption is certainly not true and may even 
not be true enough for many of the purposes they seek to 
use  it  for,  my  characterization  of  the  fixed  preferences 
assumption  as  the  neoclassical  economists’  position  is  in 
some,  and  perhaps  in  significant,  measure  foil  and 
expository device.  Section 3 discusses the shortcomings of 
the traditional economists’ account in explaining advertising. 
Section 4 sets forth my alternative process-based account, 
articulating  the  unifying  principles  and  some  possible 
determinants  of  preferences.   Section  5  considers  a  few 
examples  illuminated  by  my  account:  justifications  for 
paternalism,  contingent  valuation,  and  negotiations  in 
complex business contracting.  Section 6 concludes.
2. CRITIQUING THE NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMISTS’ VIEW
Neoclassical  economics  holds  that  preferences  are 
fixed.30  The  more  formal  articulations  tend to  emphasize 
stability and coherence: as Matt Rabin notes, “[e]conomics 
has conventionally assumed that each individual has stable 
and  coherent  preferences.”31  Coherence  usually  means 
transitivity: if Ann prefers apples to oranges and oranges to 
bananas,  she  prefers  apples  to  bananas.32  Invariance, 
30
3
. To say that preferences are fixed and not constructed is also to say 
that  preferences are (known or)  discovered  rather  than created.   While 
economists  do  not  expressly  use  the  discovery/creation  distinction,  the 
vocabulary of discovery pervades economics as well as law and economics
—consider in this regard the agency cost/lemons models, with their focus 
on acquiring information from those who, for self-serving reasons, are not 
revealing it.
31 . Rabin,  supra note  2,  at  11;  see also Becker,  supra  note  2,  at  5 
(“preferences are assumed not to change substantially over time”).
32 . There are also the time-inconsistent preferences: consumption now, 
having resources later, or eat cake now, be thin later, the explanations for 
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independent  of  stability,  is  also  part  of  the  account:  a 
preference will not “change” if it is elicited in different ways. 
A  typical  example:  If  I  favor  a  treatment  with  an  80% 
success rate, I will not reject the same treatment when it is 
presented as having a 20% failure rate. Nor will I rank order 
differently my preference for saving forests vs. oceans if  I 
am asked in different ways.33
But the assumptions go further. As Ariely, Loewenstein & 
Prelec note, “[m]odern economics assumes that exogenous 
consumer preferences interact with ‘technologies’ and initial 
endowments to produce equilibrium prices  and production 
levels.”34  The  key  word  here  is  “exogenous.”  The 
preferences  exist,  amenable  to  being  discovered  or 
revealed.35  Preferences  have,  in  the  neo-classical 
economists’ world, another important attribute as well—they 
are  “complete”36 or  “well-defined”37 and  “determinate.” 
Determinacy,  stability,  and  invariance  are  related,  part  of 
the strong-form characterization of preferences as existing 
to be discovered.
What evidence do economists have for their assumptions 
about preferences—that is, for their positive claim? Empirical 
evidence provides, at best, mixed support.38  Certainly, many 
experimental  results  contradict  neo-classical  economists’ 
assumptions.39 Some of the empirics may be questioned, on 
one  or  a  combination  of  the  following  rationales: 
experiments  may  be  badly  done,  effects  can  perhaps  be 
reversed  by  learning,  institutional  mechanisms  will  often 
compensate such that the effect will not be observed in real 
which turn on different rates of discounting.  See George Loewenstein & 
Drazen  Prelec,  Anomalies  in  Intertemporal  Choice:  Evidence  and  an 
Interpretation, 107 Q. J. ECON. 573, 573–75 (1992); Rabin, supra note 2, at 
38–41. See generally Claire A. Hill, Anti-Anti-Anti-Paternalism, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. 
&  LIBERTY 444  (2007)  (discussing  choice  between  present-preferring  and 
future-preferring conduct).
33
3
. See Slovic, supra note 1, at 364–65.
34 . Ariely, Tom Sawyer, supra note 3, at 9.
35 . See id.
36 . Id.
37 . Matthew Rabin, A  Perspective  on Psychology and Economics, 46 
EUR. ECON. REV. 657, 660 (2002).
38 . Slovic,  supra  note  1;  Rabin,  supra note  2 (both  summarize  a 
considerable amount of empirical evidence).
39 . See Rabin, supra note 2; Slovic, supra note 1; Chapman, supra note 
13, at 1173–88; Eldar Shafir & Robyn A. LeBoeuf,  Rationality, 53 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 491 (2002).  See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 6 
(containing a broad cross-section of articles summarizing theoretical and 
empirical work in the field).
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life,  or the experiments have some other defect that calls 
their validity into question.40 Indeed, these are the familiar 
critiques in traditional law and economics’ early responses to 
behavioral law and economics.41 But the results are robust.42
Neo-classical  economics  has  a  considerable  stake  in 
economists’  assumptions  about  preferences  being  true.  If 
preferences  do  not  accord  with  economists’  assumptions, 
core axioms of rational choice models, on which economics 
relies,  are  violated.43 Moreover,  an  important  economists’ 
credo is that assumptions need not be realistic or true—just 
40
4
. See Richard  Posner,  Rational  Choice,  Behavioral  Economics,  and 
the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1567 (1998).
41 . See,  e.g., id. at  1572;  Ariel  Rubinstein,  Comments on Behavioral 
Economics,  in 2  ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY:  2005  WORLD CONGRESS OF THE 
ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY 246–54  (R.  Blundell  et  al.  eds.,  2006)  (critiquing  the 
methodology  often  used  by  behavioral  economists).  Another  response, 
against  behavioral  economics  and  behavioral  law  and  economics  more 
generally  is  as  follows:  the standard economics model  is  an  affirmative 
model, elegant and developed, and all the behavioral scholars have to offer 
thus far are piecemeal critiques and no substitute model.  This response 
and criticism is completely accurate, but so what? Modeling an alternative 
will prove exceedingly difficult, but why should it take a theory to beat a 
theory?   It  may  be  that  realism  (and  predictive  power)  demands,  and 
explanation and prediction  will  be much improved by,  a  model  far  less 
elegant than the neo-classical rational choice model.  That being said, it is 
hard to dispute that at this point, behavioral economics, and behavioral law 
and economics, is more promise than results.  And there is no reasoned 
and definitive response to those who think it does take a theory to beat a 
theory.
42 . See Chapman,  supra note  13,  at  1170  (“The  literature  is  now 
huge . . . .”).  See generally  BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS,  supra note  6; 
Markman & Medin, supra note 20; Rabin, supra note 2; Slovic, supra note 1. 
In  much the  same spirit  as  Slovic’s  piece,  Matt  Rabin  very  humorously 
shows  how  economists  attempt  to  salvage  pet  views  in  the  face  of 
convincing evidence to the contrary.  Rabin hypothesizes the existence of a 
planet, “Nonhollywood,” on which economists do not believe anybody can 
get utility from what we on Earth would call entertainment items—things 
that would be consumed and would not leave anything tangible behind.  He 
imagines a scene in which somebody is  arguing with the Nonhollywood 
economists as to why people would spend $8 to go to the movies.  The 
Nonhollywood economists argue:
“But the alleged ‘preference’ is ‘unstable.’”
It  was  often  pointed  out,  and  backed  up  by  research,  that  this 
alleged  preference  for  seeing  movies  is  highly  sensitive,  and 
therefore not a real preference. While it is true that some people 
like going to the movie, it varies a great deal. It depends on mood, 
time  of  day,  etc.  Indeed,  while  behavioral  researchers  claim to 
have evidence of people willing to pay for movies, a great deal of 
experimental  evidence  by  economic  experimentalists  show  that 
this  taste  goes  away  under  only  slightly  different  conditions. 
Moreover,  when  the  experiment  was  done properly—in  the  way 
economic experimentalists understood how to do experiments—the 
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useful;44 thus, when economists are presented evidence that 
something they use in their models is not true, they have a 
ready answer.45  And in some set of cases, the assumption is 
indeed  useful—because  it  is  true  enough.46  But  the 
assumption  is  maintained  even  when  it  is  not  useful; 
economics  is  loath  to  cede  its  elegant  parsimony.  One 
obvious example is advertising. I argue in the next Section 
that economists’ arguments against the overwhelmingly held 
view and intuition that advertising is principally intended to 
affect preferences are unsuccessful.
Economists can sustain their use of, if not belief in, the 
assumption of fixed preferences because they typically focus 
on  preferences  for  particular  tangible  or  intangible  things 
(e.g., a Ford Mustang or a trip to Bali)47  from obvious choice-
taste for movies nearly completely went away. Evidence from well-
run economic experiments shows that this alleged taste for movies 
is highly ephemeral.
“But evidence shows people learn they don’t like movies. . . .”
While a few psychologists have argued that they have evidence 
that people seem to like movies, these experiments are run under 
novel conditions, and don’t allow learning. Indeed, the standard in 
psychology experiments  was to only ask people to see a movie 
once. Hence, you were told, we do not learn whether this behavior 
represents  a  robust  preference.  But  experiments  showed  that, 
while a person might pay $8 to see the movie once, maybe twice, if 
you keep  asking him for  $8 to  see  the movie,  eventually  stops 
paying. Clearly he learns he doesn’t want to see the movie! Once 
play “converges” to “equilibrium” behavior by subjects, we see no 
genuine preference for movies . . . .
Rabin, supra note 37, at 680–83.
43
4
. See generally Ariely,  Coherent Arbitrariness,  supra note  3; Slovic, 
supra note 1.
44 . One early and well-known articulation of this position is in Milton 
Friedman,  The  Methodology  of  Positive  Economics,  in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE 
ECONOMICS 3, 9–16 (1935).
45 . See id.
46 . See McDonnell,  supra note  2, at 2.  Note, though, that McDonnell 
probably  thinks  there  are  more cases where  preferences  can safely  be 
assumed to be fixed than I do.
47 . See, e.g.,  ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 58–59 
(2d  ed.  1992).  Consider  such  concepts  as  “revealed  preferences,” 
“willingness  to  pay,”  “deadweight  losses,”  and  “consumer  surplus.”  All 
these come into play paradigmatically and most readily with respect  to 
particular tangible items. See also note 27 supra, and the following quote, 
in which Gary Becker describes and critiques the standard assumptions of 
the rational choice model.
The economist’s  normal approach to analyzing consumption and 
leisure  choices  assumes  that  individuals  maximize  utility  with 
preferences that depend at any moment only on the goods and 
services  they  consume  at  that  time.  These  preferences  are 
assumed to be independent of both past and future consumption, 
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sets  (cars,  or  vacations,  within  x  price  range).48 A  person 
might very well prefer, in a coherent, transitive and stable 
way, a Ford Mustang over other cars and over having the 
cash the Mustang costs.  And economists can always raise 
the specter of a familiar and powerful argument from theory, 
Dutch  booking—if  people’s  preferences  did  not  have  the 
economist-attributed characteristics, people could be Dutch-
booked so as to lose all their money.49  The argument is part 
of  the  broader  class  of  arbitrage  arguments:  all  riskless 
arbitrage opportunities are taken advantage of fully; people 
who give away money will be driven from the market.  Many 
things follow from this argument, including that markets are 
efficient and that people in the aggregate are not “dumb.” 
The Dutch-booking argument or its more generic arbitrage 
analogue is  said  to  sound the  death-knell  for  preferences 
that do not conform to the economists’ assumptions—people 
who have such preferences can be double-booked, and will 
therefore  become  extinct.   Hence  the  normative  position 
that even if people do not have preferences that conform to 
the economists’ model, they should.
At  first  blush,  the  Dutch-booking/arbitrage  argument 
seems to have considerable intuitive appeal, especially as to 
and of the behavior of everyone else.  This approach has provided 
to  be  a  valuable  simplification  for  addressing  many  economic 
questions, but a large number of choices in all  societies depend 
very much on past experience and social forces.
Id. See also BECKER, supra note 94, in which Becker explicitly rejects the idea 
that preferences are for traditional objects of choice.
48
4
. In this regard, consider the extent to which economists have used 
money gambles to study choice.  See Markman & Medin, supra note 20, at 
413–14,  427.  Interestingly,  the  money  gamble  studies  provide  greater 
evidence  of  the  normative  position  than  the  positive  position.   The 
gambles’ expected values are computed arithmetically; some people pay 
different  amounts  for  identically  valued  gambles.   Still,  a  reasonable 
conclusion from the gambling work is that these results are exceptional: 
people perhaps not only  should use expected value computations but in 
these cases usually do so.
49 . See generally  David Laibson & Leeat Yariv, Safety in Markets:  An 
Impossibility  Theorem  for  Dutch  Books  (July  9,  2007)  (unpublished 
manuscript,  on file with author),  available at http://www.hss.caltech.edu/ 
~lyariv/Papers/DutchBooks.pdf.   Dutch-booking  arguments  work  most 
directly when intransitive preferences are at issue.  For instance, if person 
X prefers A to B, B to C, but C to A, X will pay more for A than B, and more 
for B than C, but more for C than A; somebody could engage in a series of 
transactions with X where X would be selling C for a particular price, but 
repurchasing  it  for  more;  with  enough  of  these  transactions,  X  would 
eventually  go  bankrupt.  Intransitive  preferences  are  not  coherent. 
Paradigmatic  intransitive  preferences  are,  however,  stable  and 
determinate.
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stability  and coherence  of  preferences.   If  Jones  likes  the 
Grateful Dead twice as much as he likes Jefferson Airplane 
on Monday, and the reverse on Tuesday, it is easy to see 
how somebody trading  with  Jones could  soon make Jones 
penniless.  But this seems like, in Fred Schauer’s memorable 
phrase, an “argument from a weird case.”50  In the non-weird 
everyday  cases,  there  is  a  common sense  answer  to  the 
Dutch-booking/arbitrage type of argument.51  Even if  Jones 
does have these preferences, he will probably catch on after 
one or two exchanges.52  (Or else the “irrational” preference 
is not quite what it seems to be.53  I may be willing to buy 
ten lottery tickets; it does not follow that I’d buy 10 million 
lottery tickets.54 I may simply have a budget for “irrational” 
expenditures55 that’s well within what I can afford to lose.) 
50
5
. See Frederick Schauer,  Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.  399, 421–23 
(1985).  Schauer is actually rather sympathetic to such arguments, arguing 
in effect that life is  often weird;  still,  he thinks that even slightly weird 
cases  ought  not  to  unduly  inform  rule-making  or  law-making.   See 
generally  Frederick Schauer,  Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 
883 (2006).
51 . See generally Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 50.
52 . Richard  Warner  also  makes  this  point,  in  Richard  Warner, 
Impossible  Comparisons  and  Rational  Choice  Theory,  68  S.  CAL.  L.  REV. 
1705, 1738–39 (1995).  Laibson & Yariv, supra note 49, also make a point 
to  this  effect:  “that  Dutch  Book arguments  cannot  be  used to  rule  out 
dynamically  inconsistent  preferences  and naive  beliefs.”  Id.  at  abstract. 
Rabin,  supra note 37, makes not only this point, but also a broader point 
about  the  use  of  dutch-book/arbitrage  arguments  against  “irrational” 
choices generally.  Returning to Nonhollywood, the economists are arguing 
again about preferences for movie-going. They argue:
Indeed, if there were people who went around giving $8 for nothing 
in return, they would quickly be driven from the market, so that 
their behavior would not matter: “But those behaving like this will 
be driven from the market!”
An audience member assured you that somebody willing to pay $8 
for a movie could be “Dutch-booked”: If people paid $8 just to sit in 
front of a screen, then somebody could make money off of them! 
When you respond that, yes, somebody could and is making money 
off  of  those  willing  to  pay  the  $8,  another  audience  member 
assures you that if people were really willing to pay $8 for nothing 
in return, they would in short order be bilked of all their money by 
an  arbitrageur.  When  you  shyly  suggest  that  a  consumer’s 
willingness sometimes to give some of his money to see a movie 
doesn’t  mean  he’ll  pay  infinite  amounts  to  anybody  who  offers 
movies, or suggest it might be costly to provide these movies, you 
get scoffed at for being ad hoc, changing your story,  and being 
very loose about what preferences you were proposing.
Id. at 682.
53 . See Rabin, supra note 37, at 683.
54 . See id.
55 . Or  I  am  paying  for  the  “dream”  the  lottery  promises  in  its  ad 
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Being amenable to being Dutch-booked does not seem like 
an all-or-nothing proposition.56  The irrationality, such as it is, 
is self-limiting.  And in any event, standard economic theory 
suggests that not all  Dutch-booking/arbitrage opportunities 
will  be  fully  exploited:  there  must  be,  as  Grossman  and 
Stiglitz  memorably  argued,  an  efficient  amount  of 
inefficiency  to  make  the  business  of  looking  for  such 
opportunities worthwhile.57
Furthermore,  what  may  seem  like  an  unstable 
preference may in fact be a stable preference—but not for a 
traditional object of choice.  The rational choice theory does 
not  readily  accommodate  higher  level preferences.  Three 
examples: (1) Jones wants to be stylish. She may conclude 
that she wants bell bottom pants and is willing to pay $y for 
them after she sees stylish women wearing the pants.  But 
she may later determine that bell bottoms are out of style, 
at  which  point  she  may  become  unwilling  to  wear  bell 
bottoms, much less pay for them.58  (2) Jones prefers and 
chooses  Raisin  Bran  on  Monday  and  Quaker  Oatmeal  on 
Tuesday.  Maybe his higher level  preference is  for variety
—“try different cereals every once in a while”—or frugality
—“I’ll  buy whatever is  on sale”—or time-efficient decision-
making—“I’ll  buy whatever is at the front of the store so I 
spend the least time shopping.” (3) Richard prefers Roederer 
champagne  to  Bollinger  champagne.   I  gave  Richard  one 
bottle of each champagne.  He drank the Bollinger first, on 
Labor Day, saving the Roederer.  This best accommodated 
his higher level preference for the best celebratory occasions 
possible;  he wanted to save the Roederer  for  some more 
celebratory day than Labor Day.
campaign, “buy a ticket, buy a dream.”
56
5
. See Rieskamp  et  al.,  supra note  3,  at  653  (making  related 
arguments, and characterizing the money-pump/Dutch-book argument in 
this  context  as  a  “logical  bogeyman”).  Reiskamp  et  al.’s  arguments 
“demonstrate how irrational behavior  in principle could occur, but . . . do 
not show that irrational behavior in fact occurs.”  Id.  The authors cite Lola 
Lopes,  When Time is Of the Essence: Averaging, Aspiration and the Short 
Run,  65  ORG.  BEHAV & HUM.  DECISION PROC.  179,  187 (2006) for the “logical 
bogeyman” phrase.
57 . Sanford  Grossman  &  Joseph  Stiglitz,  On  the  Impossibility  of 
Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980).  Surely, the 
wackier  and  more  self-destructive  the  preference,  the  less  certain  the 
arbitrage opportunity to exploit it is. Rather than picking up the proverbial 
$20 on the floor, the opportunity would be tantamount to reaching far into 
a smelly grate to get something that, from a distance, looked like it might 
be a coin.
58 . See Hill, Beyond Mistakes, supra note 16, at 574.
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Of  course,  there  are  “unstable”  preferences  that 
theoretically should not be problematic to standard theory 
because  they  involve  new  information.   Jones  buys  the 
oatmeal on Tuesday after a visit to his doctor reveals he has 
high  cholesterol;  Jones  buys  the  oatmeal  on  Tuesday 
because he finds out that the Raisin Bran factory emitted 
pollutants into a stream and he cares a great deal about the 
environment.59 However, these preferences certainly violate 
stability, given that stability requires (presumably counter to 
everybody’s  intuition  and  in  accord  with  nobody’s  real 
normative views) that preferences stay stable over time.
“Unstable”  preferences  of  these  sorts  are  surely 
common, but they scarcely seem amenable to being Dutch-
booked.  This is so for many reasons, including that the shifts 
at issue are hard to predict, and even harder to exploit in 
any  way  that  somebody  would  find  worthwhile. 
Considerable evidence exists that preferences work this way; 
my description at least has realism on its side.  Without the 
Dutch-booking  argument,  it  is  hard  to  make  a  normative 
argument that preferences should not work this way. 60
What  about  invariance?  It  is  important  to  distinguish 
between two types of cases. The first is the mistake type of 
case  frequently  discussed  in  the  behavioral  law  and 
economics literature, 61  which is amenable to the same sort 
of  analysis  made  above  with  respect  to  stability  and 
coherence.  The preferences at issue here do vary by mode 
of elicitation, but only because of a straightforward defect in 
reasoning.   Recall  the case of  Smith,  who has a different 
preference for a particular treatment based on whether it is 
described as having an 80% success rate or a 20% failure 
rate.  Professionals,  too,  such  as  sophisticated  investors, 
sometimes use defective reasoning. 62
59
5
. On  preferences  for  processes,  see  generally  Douglas  Kysar, 
Preferences  for  Processes:  The  Process/Product  Distinction  and  the 
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 526 (2004).
60
6
. See,  more  generally,  Chapman’s  critique  of  rational  choice  as  a 
normative  ideal,  in  Chapman,  supra note  13,  at  1170–71.   I  echo 
Chapman’s critique in Hill, supra note 16, at 590.
61 . See generally  Hill supra  note  16 (arguing that behavioral law and 
economics  frequently  takes  as  its  motivating  force  and  starting  point 
“mistakes”  (such  as  hindsight  bias,  over/underestimation  of  remote 
probabilities, salience effects and so on)).
62 . See,  e.g., Guillermo Baquero & Marno Verbeek,  Do Sophisticated 
Investors  Believe  in the Law of  Small  Numbers? 5  (ERIM Report  Series, 
Working  Paper  Reference  No.  ERS-2006-033-F&A),  available  at 
http://papers. ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=917460  (“Our results 
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But many cases do not involve mistakes;63 rather, they 
involve  situations  in  which  people  form  their  preferences 
based on how they come to understand the choice they are 
making, when many different constructions are possible and 
warranted by the underlying facts.64  The choice made at a 
particular time is context-specific.  In a different context, the 
choice may be different.  Just as I argued with many types of 
instability,  there is considerable evidence that preferences 
do work this  way,  and it  is  not clear  why as a normative 
matter  such  preferences  should  be  undesirable.65  Classic 
examples from the experimental literature include situations 
in which, as between a fancy pen and money, many people 
prefer the money, but when a third option, a cheap pen, is 
presented,  many more people prefer the expensive pen.66 
indicate  that  the  length  of  the  streak  of  a  hedge fund  manager  has  a 
statistically and economically significant impact on flows, beyond what is 
justified  by  expected  future  performance  of  the  fund,  suggesting  that 
investors overinfer the likelihood of performance persistence.”).
63
6
. I discuss in Hill, supra note 16, how behavioral law and economics’ 
focus on mistakes disserves the goal of making law and economics more 
realistic.
64 . The two types of cases are quite different. The mistake cases lead 
to a different (and ultimately more limited and tractable) research agenda 
than  cases  that  do  not  constitute  mistakes.   The  mistakes  agenda  is 
presumably to educate people not to make mistakes or not act on them, or 
limit the damage if they do act on them, or something of the sort.  The 
framing/elicitation agenda is much more open ended.
65 . But  how  do  we  determine  what  is  desirable  in  a  world  where 
preferences are constructed? I consider this issue at greater length in the 
Conclusion.
66 . See Chapman, supra note 13, at 1177 (citing GRAHAM ALLISON, ESSENCE 
OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1971)); Shafir et al.,  supra note 
20;  see  also Sunstein,  Endogenous  Preferences, supra note  11, at  222 
(making a similar point). There is considerable scholarship on preference 
instability; different work describes different types of instability, and gives 
different  explanations.   See,  e.g.,  On  Amir  &  Jonathan  Levav, Choice 
Construction versus Preference Construction: The Instability of Preferences 
Learned in Context (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The 
Minnesota  Journal  of  Law,  Science  &  Technology),  available  at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=928984.
Preference  consistency  implies  that  people  have  learned  their 
willingness  to  trade  off  attributes.  We  argue  that  this  is  not 
necessarily the case. Instead, we show that when preferences are 
learned in context  (e.g.,  through repeated choices made from a 
trinary  choice  set  that  includes  an  asymmetrically  dominated 
decoy),  people  learn  a  context-specific  choice  heuristic  (e.g., 
always choose the asymmetrically dominating option), which leads 
to  less  consistent  preferences  across  contexts.  In  contrast, 
repeated  choices  from  sets  containing  only  two  options  impel 
people  to  learn  their  subjective  attribute  weights,  yielding 
preferences  that  are  consistent  across  contexts.  The  difference 
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There are many psycholog-ical accounts of why preferences 
might work this way: a person is looking for a basis to make 
a  decision,  and  finds  such  a  basis  in  a  comparison  of 
alignable attributes, 67 for instance.  Indeed, especially for a 
relatively inconsequential decision, a set of rough-and-ready 
decision  rules  may  be  more  useful  than  a  specific  rank 
ordering,  preserving  cognitive  resources.   In  the  pen 
example,  the  rules  could  be,  respectively:  the  default  to 
prefer money over something with roughly equivalent value; 
next, where there are three choices, if there are two roughly 
equivalent choices and there is a third choice that is more 
clearly inferior to one of the equivalent choices (the cheap 
pen), pick the clearly superior choice.68 .
Another  example  involves  competing  higher-order 
values.  Imagine  that  Jones  is  both  frugal  and  an 
environmentalist.  Jones  is  at  a  store,  choosing  between 
cheap sneakers and more expensive ones certified as being 
made by a manufacturer who does not pollute.  If Jones is 
wearing his  “frugal”  hat—say,  he just splurged, or he just 
talked to his spendthrift relative- he may be inclined to pick 
the cheaper option. If he is wearing his “environmentalist” 
hat—perhaps  he  spent  the  preceding  evening  with  his 
environmentalist friends, or he just passed a landfill—he may 
be inclined to pick the more environmentally friendly option, 
notwithstanding that it is more expensive.
Jones’s  preference-  and  choice-  therefore  might  be 
different depending on when he makes it; the subject in the 
pen  experiment’s  preference  and  choice  is  different 
between  choice  construction  and  preference  construction  is  of 
importance  to  marketing  managers  because  repeat  purchase  is 
typically interpreted as a signal of customer preference. We show 
that this “preference” might just be a learned solution to the choice 
problem,  and  that  as  soon  as  the  competitive  context  changes 
(even  in  a  normatively  meaningless  way),  so  will  consumers’ 
“preferences.”
Id. at  2; see  also Dan  Simon  et  al.,  Construction  of  Preferences  by 
Constraint Satisfaction, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 331, 331 (2004) (“over the course of 
decision  making . . .  preferences  shifted  to  cohere  with  the  choice 
[made]”).
67
6
. On alignable attributes, see Markman & Medin, supra note 20.
68 . Indeed, when I was going to college, it was trendy for a few months 
for friends I knew to appoint “random decision makers” to come up with 
and apply, principles in daily activities.  Some of the principles made some 
surface sense (get the cheaper one) and some were more random (do the 
thing that is first in the alphabet, or is to the physical left).  The rationale 
was that extensive deliberation as to everything probably does not pay off, 
and that a mechanical formula was a good way to streamline the process.
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depending on what else he’s choosing from. That this is so, 
and that  this  is  rational,  is  well  explained  by  philosopher 
David Wiggins:
No theory, if it is to recapitulate or reconstruct practical reasoning 
even as well  as mathematical  logic recapitulates or reconstructs 
the  actual  experience  of  conducting  or  exploring  deductive 
argument,  can treat  the concerns which an agent brings to any 
situation as forming a closed, complete, consistent system.  For it 
is  of  the  essence  of  these  concerns  to  make  competing  and 
inconsistent  claims.   (This  is  a  mark  not  of  irrationality  but  of 
rationality in the face of the plurality of ends and the plurality of 
human goods.)  The weight of these concerns is not necessarily 
fixed in advance.  Nor need the concerns be hierarchically ordered. 
Indeed, a man’s reflection on a new situation that confronts him 
may disrupt such order and fixity as had previously existed, and 
bring a change in his evolving conception of the point . . . or the 
several or many points, of living or acting.69
What about preferences that are indeterminate? There 
are  two  possibilities.   Perhaps  the  preference  was 
indeterminate  before  it  was  elicited,  but  became 
determinate  and  stable  thereafter.   Alternatively,  perhaps 
the  preference  was  elicited  and  then  became  unstable. 
Indeterminacy by  itself  is  problematic  for  the  neoclassical 
position insofar as it violates the completeness axiom, which 
provides  that  people  can  rank-order  all  their  preferences. 
They  “consult  a  free-standing  preference  menu”  existing 
“before  the  time  of  decision  and  choice.”70  Again, 
preferences  that  were  indeterminate  before  they  were 
elicited but, once elicited, were stable seem both to exist as 
a descriptive matter and to be normatively unobjectionable. 
Why should we know what we want before we need to make 
a choice?  So long as the preference becomes determinate 
once  elicited,  Dutch-booking  arguments  are  not  available. 
Smith may decide that she wants a dog and is willing to pay 
$x for it after a dog-loving friend takes her on an energetic 
walk  with  the friend’s  dog in  a city  where Smith has just 
moved.  It  could  have  been  otherwise.   If  Smith  had  just 
joined a gym before taking the walk, she might have decided 
that she didn’t have time or need for extra exercise; if she 
hadn’t moved to the new city, she would not have taken the 
walk and discovered her liking for dogs.
My recent purchase of a digital camera provides another 
69
6
. David  Wiggins,  Deliberation  and  Practical  Reason,  in ESSAYS ON 
ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS 221, 223 (Amélie Oksenberg Rorty ed. 1980).
70
7
. Sunstein,  Endogenous Preferences, supra note  11, at 2637, 2652; 
see also Loewenstein & Prelec, supra note 32.
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example.  When I started the process, I had very little idea 
which  features  mattered  to  me.   At  a  certain  point,  after 
inquiries that were not random but were scarcely systematic 
(that  is,  some  number  of  web  searches,  but  no  meta-
searches to determine which web sources were particularly 
reliable),  I  stopped  looking  and  bought  the  camera  that 
seemed best based on the criteria I had thus far formulated, 
even  though  I  knew  I  did  not  have  full  information.71 My 
trajectory was path dependent: my choice might have been 
otherwise had my searches yielded different information in a 
different order.72
But  what  if  the  preference,  once  elicited,  is  not 
determinate, but rather,  is unstable or variant  to context? 
The analysis is the same as set forth above: many (most?) 
instances  of  seeming  instability  or  seeming  variance  are 
hard  to  characterize  as  either  unlikely  or  normatively 
undesirable.
Where are we left?  First, the obvious: the rational choice 
model, in which preferences are fixed, is on shaky ground, 
both  descriptively  and  normatively.   Dutch  booking 
arguments will not work for the bulk of cases.  Indeed, there 
are perfectly sensible accounts one can give of preferences 
that deviate from the model.  Second, there is no reason to 
suppose a rational person would generally follow the axioms 
of the rational choice model.  In a subset of cases, notably 
the mistake cases, it  is fair to describe the deviation from 
71
7
. In other words, I satisficed rather than maximized.  The terminology 
of satisficing vs. maximizing is Herbert Simon’s.  Barry Schwartz’s recent 
book The Paradox of Choice makes much of it, arguing persuasively for the 
benefits of satisficing and the costs of maximizing. BARRY SCHWARTZ, PARADOX OF 
CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS  (2004).  Note that this type of account does very 
little violence to the remainder of the traditional economic model. Here, 
satisficing means stopping further inquiries when their cost exceeds their 
benefit. That being said, I have elsewhere argued that the traditional model 
seems far more determinate in this regard than it is.  The point at which 
costs exceed benefits is difficult, if not impossible, to determine in many 
cases; assessing costs or benefits of acquiring or verifying information is 
scarcely  straightforward  or  mechanical.   How  do  we  know  how  much 
benefit acquiring particular information will offer? How much it will cost? 
See  Claire A. Hill  & Christopher King,  How Do German Contracts Do As 
Much With Fewer Words, 79  CHI.-KENT L. REV. 889, 939 n.26 (2004).  This 
criticism is different but complementary.
72 . It  is possible I  might change my mind later,  if I acquire different 
information that tells me I incorrectly valued characteristics of the camera 
(or,  of  course,  my  preferences  themselves  change);  in  this  case,  the 
analysis about indeterminate preferences that become variant or unstable 
would apply.
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the model as irrational.  Even then, however, the irrationality 
is  probably  self-limiting.   A  person  may  not  make  ideal 
choices—she may prefer the treatment with the 80% cure 
rate to the (identical) treatment with the 20% failure rate. 
But she might understand that a 65% cure rate is worse than 
a 25% failure rate.
In  other  supposed  deviations  from the  rational  choice 
axioms,  people  may  be  making  choices  in  some  manner 
other  than  by  consulting  an  invariant  complete  rank 
ordering.   What  might  people  have  instead  of  invariant 
complete  rank  orderings?  In  Section  4,  I  hypothesize  that 
they  have  ways  of  making  choices:  they  construct 
narratives,  using evaluative  criteria  against  a  backdrop of 
wants, desires and inclinations, some of which they rank and 
some  of  which  they  do  not.  Their  wants,  desires  and 
inclinations  are  for  both  traditional  objects  of  choice  and 
higher  order  values  and desires,  as  previously  formulated 
and  as  constructed  and  elicited  in  the  choice-making 
process.  And their methodology, as I hypothesize it to be, 
economizes  on cognitive  resources,  making  a strong case 
that it is rational.
3. THE CASE OF ADVERTISING
Advertising  presents  a  puzzle  for  economists:  if 
preferences exist to be discovered and revealed, what are 
advertisers doing? If there were a context, one might think, 
in  which  the  fixed  preferences  assumption  should  be 
abandoned  as  not  true  enough  to  be  useful,  it  is  as  to 
advertising.  But neoclassical economists nevertheless try to 
explain advertising while holding onto their assumption.
And  in  some  cases,  they  can.   Sometimes  the 
economists  answer  the  question  “what  are  advertisers 
doing?” by saying “advertisers are providing information.”  I 
once lived in a very noisy apartment at a busy intersection in 
New York.  The windows were old; garbage trucks came by 
at  all  hours;  and  a  “singer”  across  the  street  sang  very 
badly, at all hours, in hopes that people would pay for his 
silence.  I heard an ad on the radio: “are you bothered by 
lots of street noise? Buy our white noise machine that blocks 
out  street  noise.”   The  ad  was  from a  reputable  store;  I 
immediately called and placed my order.
But, as economists acknowledge, much advertising is not 
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informative,73 at least about the products or services being 
advertised.  Certainly, the explosive growth of TiVo, which 
permits people to block advertisements, shows that people 
will  pay  to  avoid  advertising,  something  they  presumably 
wouldn’t be so ready to do if they were getting information 
they  valued.74  What  do  economists  say  about  such 
advertisements?75 The  classic  signaling  story  is  one 
possibility.  Providers  of  goods  and  services  are  signaling 
their confidence in their products or services by using high-
priced celebrities or making other conspicuous expenditures 
that will be worthless if their products or services are not of 
good quality.76 But why not simply publicize how much an 
73
7
. See, e.g.,  Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy,  A Simple Theory of 
Advertising  as  a  Good  or  Bad,  108  Q.  J.  ECON. 941  passim  (1993).  But 
indirect provision of information through a chain of inferences may indeed 
be part of what is at work in some instances, as discussed in note 76, infra. 
74 . People do not avoid  all  advertisements.  Indeed, there are awards 
for  the  best  ads.   See  About  the  CLIO  Awards, 
http://www.clioawards.com/about  (last  visited  Apr.  25,  2008).  Especially 
good advertisements  are viewed voluntarily  on the Internet.  But people 
would still avoid most advertisements if they could.  A recent example of 
efforts along these lines is the pop-up blocker.
75 . Interestingly,  many economists  are hostile to advertising, but,  of 
course,  not  on  account  of  commercialism  or  amorality.   Among  the 
economists’ objections are that advertising might help monopolists raise 
barriers  to  entry  for  potential  competitors,  or  that  it  might  simply  shift 
demand from one product  to  another  without  an aggregate increase  in 
utility.  See Jeffry M. Netter,  Excessive Advertising: An Empirical Analysis, 
30  J.  INDUS.  ECON. 361  passim  (1982).   Interestingly,  notwithstanding the 
intuitive force of the second claim, it’s  a difficult one for economists  to 
flesh out and argue properly.  By what mechanism would demand shift? 
How can Coke persuade people who “prefer” Pepsi to buy Coke instead?  If 
people’s preferences are fixed, how could advertising make a difference? 
For  an  interesting  theory  as  to  how advertising  might  be  economically 
efficient, see  Becker  &  Murphy,  supra  note  73.  Becker  and  Murphy 
characterize  “advertisements  as  one  of  the  goods  that  enter  the  fixed 
preferences of consumers.” They argue that advertisements do not change 
tastes, but are instead complements to the goods being advertised.  Id. at 
942.. “There is no reason to claim that advertisements change tastes just 
because they affect the demand for other goods.” Id.
76 . The extreme but paradigmatic case is one in which the celebrity is 
simply  a  disguised  price  tag.   The  example  often  given  is  the  ads  for 
pantyhose featuring sports star Joe Namath. But this is a bad example: why 
should Joe not know what kind of  pantyhose he would like to see on a 
woman? And why should women not care a great deal about his opinion on 
this subject? And presumably Sam Waterston advertising TD Waterhouse is 
implicitly representing that he has investigated the company and they are 
not fly-by-nights.  More generally, another, complementary type of indirect 
information  provision  may also  be  occurring in  some types  of  celebrity 
advertising: people may infer that a celebrity would not have participated 
in the advertising if she did not believe the product was good, and that her 
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advertising  campaign  costs?  Wouldn’t  doing  so  signal 
confidence more directly and enable comparisons of relative 
confidence among manufacturers?77
None of this is to say that advertisements do not signal 
confidence  in  what  is  being  advertised:  Presumably,  most 
manufacturers  believe  in  their  products  and  expend 
significant  resources  in  making  and  promoting  them.  And 
they may reason that even if people make efforts via TiVo 
and  other  means  to  avoid  advertisements,  negative 
inferences might be drawn from their not advertising when 
their competitors are doing so.78 Rather, it is to say that they 
must  also  be  doing  something  else,  and  importantly  so. 
Confidence by itself is not sufficient for business success;79 it 
may not even be necessary, as suggested by the word-of-
belief  counts  for  something,  especially  if  she  is  considered  to  have 
knowledge relevant to the product or to be circumspect about lending her 
name to  advertising  campaigns.  This  account  works  nicely  within  the 
neoclassical  paradigm.  However,  it  only  applies  to  a  subset  of  what  is 
already  a  subset  of  advertisements,  celebrity  advertisements.   More 
significantly,  the  mechanism it  postulates  also  ultimately  relies  on  the 
construction of  preferences.   Consider  in this regard how we determine 
whose knowledge counts, and who is considered authoritative.  
One pure  signaling  example  may be  the  use  of  William Shatner  in 
advertisements—at this point, the mechanism seems to be the equivalent 
of  a catchy tune rather than any indirect provision of  information other 
than the company believes in the product enough to bother finding and 
paying Mr.  Shatner.   See  Nina M.  Lentini, For Some Aging Actors,  Self-
Mockery Sells, N.Y. TIMES,  Mar. 1, 2007, at C11 (“It is ‘difficult to make a 
compelling, logical, rational argument for these products’ superiority over 
their rivals,’ Mr. Martin [a psychology professor] said, so advertisers need 
to ‘evoke positive associations with the product in the minds of the viewers 
without encouraging them to think too much about it.’”).  See also GARY S. 
BECKER & KEVIN M. MURPHY, SOCIAL ECONOMICS 4 (2000), discussing a different but 
perhaps related mechanism. (“Advertising suggesting that Michael Jordan 
eats a particular breakfast cereal may induce many children and adults to 
eat this cereal so that they can vicariously be ‘closer’ to this superb former 
basketball player.”).
77
7
. Becker  &  Murphy  make  essentially  this  point.   See  Becker  & 
Murphy,  supra  note  73,  at  944.  One  answer  within  the  neoclassical 
framework for the Waterston and Namath types of ads is that these ads 
may  provide  the  best  combination  of  two  types  of  information:  the 
information  about  the  product  or  service  inferred  from  the  celebrity’s 
presumed  knowledge  or  circumspection,  and  the  information  about  the 
manufacturer’s confidence in the product, given that it’s known that the 
celebrity’s services do not come cheaply.  
78 . See C. Robert Clark & Ig Horstmann, Advertising and Coordination 
in Markets with Consumption Scale Effects, 14 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 377, 
380 (2005).
79 . I  discuss  this  point  in  Claire  A.  Hill, Law and  Economics  in  the 
Personal Sphere, 29 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 219, 246–247 (2004).
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mouth re-popularization of Hush Puppies shoes, described by 
Malcolm Gladwell in The Tipping Point.80
Another  argument  available  to  economists  is  that 
advertisements  can  allow  somebody  to  coordinate  her 
behavior  with  others’  behavior  by  conveying  information 
about what others might do.81  If Sarah Jessica Parker is a 
cool  celebrity at time T and she appears in an ad for the 
Gap, I may conclude that many people I know will also wear 
Gap  clothes,  and  therefore  purchase  the  clothes.   The 
coordination  theory  is  also  right  in  many  cases  but  is 
incomplete;  it  cannot  explain  why  some  attempts  at 
coordination  succeed  while  others  do  not.82  This 
80
8
. MALCOLM GLADWELL,  THE TIPPING POINT:  HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG 
DIFFERENCE 3–5 (2000).
81 . See  generally Clark  &  Horstmann,  supra note  78,  at  394–95 
(arguing  that  advertising  for  products  that  have  no  obvious  quality 
differentiation can be explained in part by the observation that “consumers 
care how many others also consume a given product”); C. Robert Clark & Ig 
Horstmann,  Celebrity Endorsements (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author).
82 . Clark  & Hortsmann,  supra  note  78,  addresses  this  question,  but 
only partially.
Why  do  some  firms  use  celebrity  endorsements  in  their  ad 
campaigns  and  others  do  not  and  what  are  the  circumstances 
under which celebrities are likely to be observed? In markets  in 
which advertising coordinates consumer purchases,  we find that 
celebrity endorsements  are more likely chosen for  products that 
have either i) high price-cost margins, ii) large potential customer 
pools  or  iii)  the  need  to  coordinate  across  diverse  sets  of 
customers. We also find that “successful” celebrity endorsements 
are  ones  that  enhance  brand  recall  while  “unsuccessful” 
endorsements are ones that enhance consumer perceptions of the 
product.  We  also  find  an  explanation  for  the  use  of  “fictional” 
celebrities like Joe Camel.
Id.
They cannot, and do not purport to, explain why ads with celebrity A might 
be  successful  whereas  others  with  celebrity  B might  not  be.   See also 
Michael Suk-Young Chwe, Believe the Hype: Solving Coordination Problems 
with  Television  Advertising (Jan.  1998)  (unpublished  manuscript,  on  file 
with The Minnesota Journal  of  Law, Science & Technology),  available at 
http://www.  shwe.net/michael/papers.html  (arguing  for  a  coordination 
account  of  advertising  on  popular  programs);  Tuvana  Pastine  &  Ivan 
Pastine, Coordination in Markets with Consumption Externalities: The Role 
of  Advertising  and  Product  Quality, 2005  CEPR  DISCUSSION PAPER 5152 
(providing a coordination explanation “for the empirical observation that in 
some markets high quality is associated with lower levels of advertising”).
The main result  is  that advertisers  of  “coordination problem” or 
“social”  goods,  in  our sample computers,  beer,  pizza,  and wine, 
tend to advertise on more popular shows and are willing to spend 
significantly more per  viewer  than advertisers  of  other  products 
such as batteries, deodorant, and breakfast cereal. The explanation 
offered  here  is  that  for  technological  reasons  in  the  case  of 
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incompleteness points to a difficulty in accommodating into 
a  neo-classical  economics  framework  the  mechanism  by 
which ads might coordinate.
Contrast coordination accounts used as explanations for 
law.83  The  classic  example  is  traffic  signals:  it  does  not 
matter which side of the street people drive on so long as 
they  all  drive  on  the  same  side.  As  Richard  McAdams 
explains,
[L]egal  expression can . . .  provide a  focal  point  for  coordinating 
individual action. Because the “mentioned” solution tends to be the 
most  salient,  when the  legal  rule  is  sufficiently  publicized,  it 
provides salience to one kind of behavior. Law can thereby work 
expressively  even  if  people  do  not  believe  they  have  a  moral 
obligation to obey it.84
McAdams’s  explanation  shows  precisely  how  the 
economists’  coordination account of  advertising is  lacking. 
The key is that law is automatically well-situated to be focal. 
Advertisements are not.85 Law has a built-in gravitas, and is 
often salient in a way other communications cannot readily 
be.   It  also  has  a  primacy  that  is  antithetical  to 
advertisement: to overstate the case a bit, there is one law, 
whereas there are many products in competition with one 
another.   Furthermore,  from  an  individual’s  perspective, 
there may be an economy of scope between the expressive 
and classic incentive-based function of law.  Finally, people 
may simply believe that law generally gets it right as to what 
things ought to be prohibited; again, the coordination may 
piggyback on the other reasons to obey law.86  Law inherits a 
position with built-in importance.  A particular advertisement 
does not, and it may or may not succeed in acquiring such a 
position.87
If  advertising  is  not  automatically  well  situated  to  be 
focal, how does it help coordinate behavior? The common-
sense answer—that in  some circumstances it comes to be 
focal—relies  on  the  construction  of  preferences.   When 
seeing Sarah Jessica Parker looking stylish with Gap clothing, 
enough people  may or  may not come to believe that  the 
clothes are cool,  in  the mystical,  as yet badly understood 
computers and social reasons in the case of beer, pizza, and wine, 
a person’s preference for these goods increases in the number of 
other people who buy that good. When a consumer sees a brand 
advertised on a popular show, she not only learns about the brand, 
she  learns  that  many  other  people  know  about  it  also.  Hence 
advertisers of social goods are willing to pay a premium for slots on 
popular shows.
Chew, supra, at 1–2.
CLAIRE A. HILL, "THE RATIONALITY OF PREFERENCE CONSTRUCTION (AND THE IRRATIONALITY OF RATIONAL CHOICE)," 9(2) 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 689-742 (2008).
716 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 9:2
and  difficult  to  predict,  process  by  which  that  status  is 
conferred  on  things,  people,  ideas,  lifestyles,  and  so  on. 
They may come to think others will find the clothes cool as 
well.   The collective belief  that  something is  cool  (or  that 
many people find it so) is what makes it so, and thus, often, 
what makes it become a preference. It is not as though the 
Gap’s  clothes  are  stylish  in  some  factual  sense,  or  were 
stylish independent of or prior to being depicted and then 
thought of as such.  The advertising campaigns associating 
the clothes with coolness are probably a necessary part of 
this process,88 but are scarcely sufficient; some advertising 
campaigns  fail  miserably.   Advertising  can  indeed 
coordinate, but has no built-in or assured ability to do so.  To 
be  sure,  the  neoclassical  position  is  not  challenged  just 
because  an  explanation  it  proposes  relies  on  coordination 
and cannot explain why people would coordinate around a 
particular thing.  Certainly, green lights are to be explained 
as coordination, even though it  is  not clear why everyone 
would coordinate around them. The difficulty is in the basis 
for  the  remainder  of  the  explanation—in  this  case:  a 
83
8
. See Richard McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 
VA. L. REV. 1649, 1651 (2000) (“[L]aw provides a focal point around which 
individuals can coordinate their behavior. When individuals have a common 
interest  in  coordinating,  as  frequently  occurs,  a  legal  rule  may  guide 
behavior  merely  by  influencing  expectations  about  how  others  will 
behave.”).
84 . Id. at 1666.
85 . McAdams notes:
[T]here  are  three  reasons  to  suppose  that  legal  expression  can 
sometimes  facilitate  coordination  when  other  third-party 
communication  cannot.  The  publicity  frequently  accorded  law 
means it is more likely to create the expectations necessary for 
coordination. Further, various features of law create a uniqueness 
to legal expression that frequently causes its message to “stand 
out” against the background of public discourse. Finally, because 
the publicity and uniqueness of law gives government officials the 
ability to create a focal point and influence behavior, these officials 
may  develop  a  reputation  for  correctly  “predicting”  future 
behavior. The claim is not that law is invariably better than private 
expression at facilitating coordination, but only that it often is.
Id. at 1668.
86 . Id. at 1668 – 1672.
87 . Might advertising attempt to be focal more often than law does? 
Even if it does, the analysis stays the same.  One advertiser is competing 
against others; the law has no comparable competition.
88 . That  being  said,  some  things  become  trendy  without  purposive 
effort  by  any  of  the  obvious  candidates.   See supra  note  80 and 
accompanying text (noting the Hush Puppies example given by Malcolm 
Gladwell).
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“creation,” or “construction,” of what is cool, developed as a 
(probably  unstable)  instantiation  of  a  higher  order 
preference.89
Indeed,  non-informative  advertising  often  links  the 
products  or  services  advertised  to  generally-held  higher-
order preferences, supplying the narrative needed to make 
the link.  One memorable shampoo commercial’s pitch was 
that using the advertised shampoo would be, to express the 
matter delicately,  an ecstatic  experience.  The advertisers 
presumably hope that  people buying the shampoo will,  at 
least facetiously, characterize the experience of using it, as 
being within the category “ecstatic experiences” rather than 
just among “cleaning and hygiene promoting experiences.” 
There may be an identity adjunct as well.  A person might 
want  to  be  the  sort  of  person  who  chose  her  shampoo 
because of the pitch at issue—because she wanted to think 
of  herself,  or  depict  herself  to  others,  as  somebody  who 
valued ecstatic experiences.
Indeed,  in  examples  involving  trends,  fashion  and the 
like,  the  preferences  are  apt  to  be  higher  order:  status, 
glamour, healthy lifestyle and so on.  Identity considerations
—how a person does, and wants to, view herself—are often 
part and parcel of higher order preferences.  A person may 
want to think of herself as being stylish, and as informing 
herself  about  what  it  takes  to  be  stylish.   (It  could  be 
otherwise.  Academics  are  overrepresented  among  people 
who not only do not care about style, but also take pride in 
not caring about it.)
I  have  thus  far  argued  that  advertising  may  work  by 
appealing  to  pre-existing  higher-order  preferences—
convincing people that a particular product will  promote a 
healthy  lifestyle,  or  will  give  them  particular  sorts  of 
89
8
. Any sensible  construction  of  the  neoclassical  view  does  have  to 
allow for the existence of fads.  See, e.g., BECKER & MURPHY, supra note 76 at 
3.  (“[E]ndless examples attest to the great impact of culture, norms and 
social structure.  Popular restaurants and books are determined in good 
part  by  which  is  considered  ‘in’. . . .”).  Fads  will  necessarily  lead  to 
violations of the traditional axioms if the objects of the fads, the so-called 
traditional  objects  of  choice,  are  what  are  regarded  as  preferences; 
consider in this  regard Becker’s  statement  that  preferences  are not  for 
traditional objects of choice, quoted in note 94, infra and discussed in note 
47,  supra, and accompanying text. If the neoclassical view can allow that 
the preference can be higher-order (a  preference to  be fashionable,  for 
instance) it will  not be so easily violated.  But I argue in Section 5 that 
there are many instantiations for even one higher-order preference, and 
many such preferences also can conflict.
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experiences different than what they might have supposed. 
Whether advertising really seeks to convince people these 
things  are  literally  true,  as  opposed  to  making  them 
associate the product with the desired category, is beyond 
the  scope  of  this  article.   In  the  succeeding  Section,  I 
consider  the  mechanism  by  which  people  might  become 
convinced—the narrative that people construct.
4. HOW ARE PREFERENCES CONSTRUCTED?  AN 
ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT
At  this  juncture,  it  is  appropriate  to  turn  to  a  basic 
question:  What  is  a  preference?   Merriam  Webster, 
unhelpfully, defines a preference as “one that is preferred.” 
The definition of  “preferred”  leads,  equally  unhelpfully,  to 
another definition: “to like better or best.”90  The literature 
often  treats  as  synonymous  preference  and  choice:  one 
chooses what one prefers. For economists, preferences are 
either  choices  (as  to  which  the preference  is  revealed  by 
making  the  choice)  or  hypothetical  choices  one  would 
make.91
But  on  further  reflection,  this  view  of  preferences  is 
difficult  to  maintain.   As  the  examples  in  the  previous 
90
9
. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY,  http://www.m-w.com/ 
dictionary/preferred.
91 . The Economist  Magazine’s  on-line dictionary of  economics terms 
defines preference as “[w]hat consumers want. See Revealed Preference.” 
Economics  A-Z,  ECONOMIST.COM, http://www.economist.com/research/ 
Economics/alphabetic.cfm?  letter=P#preference.   The  definition  of 
Revealed Preference contains the following joke:  “‘two economists see a 
Ferrari.  ‘I  want one of those,’ says the first.  “Obviously not,’ replies the 
other.’” This demonstrates the theory that what a person wants is revealed 
not by what she says but by she does.  Economics A-Z, ECONOMIST.COM, http://
www.economist.  com/research/Economics/alphabetic.cfm?
term=revealedpreference#revealedpreference.   But clearly a person can 
have a preference in the absence of having to make a choice,  and can 
have to make a choice not completely in accord with her preferences.  As 
Cass Sunstein puts it,
If preferences are reducible to choices, we can dispense with the 
idea  of  preferences  entirely.   But  if  we  do  this,  much  of  the 
explanatory value of expected utility and rational choice theory will 
be lost. . . . [I]t will  be necessary to give up on the notion of an 
underlying causal relationship between choices and internal mental 
states.   An important goal of rational choice theory has been to 
help  show  how  choices  connect  with  preferences,  defined 
independently of choices.
Sunstein,  Endogenous Preferences, supra note  11, at 222.  Some might 
argue that rational choice theorists have abandoned this goal; in my view, 
if they have, doing so was a mistake.
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Section  indicate,  people  have  many  preferences—when  a 
choice is called for, they may or may not choose what they 
“prefer.”  I prefer chocolate over vanilla.  I prefer being fit to 
being unfit.   If  I  choose going to the gym over chocolate, 
what does this say about the fact that I have quite a strong 
preference for chocolate over many other things? And what 
if I choose going to the gym on one occasion and on another 
occasion, I choose the chocolate?92  And what if I have a rule 
that I will not have chocolate more than twice a month, and 
the third time in a month that I’m offered chocolate (or am 
offered a set of choices that includes chocolate) I decline the 
chocolate because of my rule? Preferences, then, are rank 
orderings,  but  almost  certainly  not  complete  or  invariant 
rank  orderings;  they  are  relevant  to  choice  but  do  not 
determine choice.93  I prefer oysters to clams and mussels. 
Where does Mozart fit  into this  ordering? Do I  like Mozart 
more or less than mussels? What if I have $20 to spend and I 
can either buy oysters, clams, mussels, or a CD of Mozart? 
What is the relationship between preferences and choices? 
Choices are preferences all things considered. Moreover, one 
can  have  a  preference  for  something  that  one  could  not 
feasibly  make a  particular  choice for—something that  has 
many  disparate  realizations—say,  health,  happiness,  or  a 
relaxing  vacation.  These  are  higher  order  preferences. 
Preferences with less disparate realizations (say, chocolate) 
can be considered lower order.94
92
9
. Whatever else it means, it does not mean I could be Dutch-booked.
93 . See Bowles,  supra  note  2,  at  78  (“Preferences  are  reasons  for 
behavior, that is, attributes of individuals that (along with their beliefs and 
capacities) account for the actions they take in a given situation.”). Bowles 
also characterizes preferences as “cultural traits, or learned influences on 
behavior:  liking  ice  cream,  or  never  lying,  or  reciprocating  dinner 
invitations are cultural traits.” Id at 80.
94 . See AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 14 (2002) (discussing Arrow’s 
“far-reaching  characterization  of  preference”  as  “including  a  person’s 
‘entire system of values, including values about values’”) (quoting KENNETH 
ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 18 (1963));  see also Bowles,  supra 
note  2,  at  78–79  (“[P]references  go  considerably  beyond  tastes,  as  an 
adequate  account  of  individual  actions would have  to  include values or 
what  Amartya  Sen . . .  terms  commitments  and  John  Harsanyi . . .  calls 
moral preferences (as distinct from personal preferences).”).  Interestingly, 
Gary Becker, generally a proponent of orthodox views about preferences, 
said:
The  preferences  that  are  assumed to  be  stable  do not  refer  to 
market goods and services, like oranges, automobiles, or medical 
care, but to underlying objects of choice that are produced by each 
household using market goods and services, their own time, and 
other  inputs.  These  underlying  preferences  are  defined  over 
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And what of unranked tastes or interests? If the movers 
ask where I would like my couch placed, I may think “the 
living  room  or  the  second  bedroom  seem  good”  without 
preferring the one to the other. I do have to make a choice, 
and so I decide which I prefer. But the initial tastes or views 
were  not  rank-ordered.  These  are  what  Donald  Davidson 
usefully calls “pro-attitudes.”95
The  economists’  descriptive  take  allows  them  to 
hypothesize  a  comparatively  simple  relationship  between 
preferences and choices: preferences are either revealed (by 
being chosen) or would be revealed (chosen). I did choose 
chocolate over vanilla. Were I to be given a choice between 
zinfandel and ice cream, I would take the zinfandel. But a 
rejection of their descriptive (and normative) position along 
the lines of the previous Section also yields recognition that 
the relationship between preferences and choices is far more 
complicated.
How do people make choices? In their accounts, Shafir et 
al. and Chapman use the term “reasons.”96 My account has a 
related albeit broader concept:  narrative.97 All  reasons are 
narratives, but there is more to many narratives. And some 
fundamental  aspects  of  life,  such  as  health,  prestige,  sensual 
pleasure, benevolence, or envy, that do not always bear a stable 
relation to market goods and services.”
Becker, supra note 2, at 5.  Becker is not completely orthodox; consider the 
quote  above,  as  well  as  his  statement  that  his  “approach  incorporates 
experiences and social  forces into preferences or tastes.”  Becker,  supra 
note 3, at 4.  But Becker’s views have remained true in significant part to 
the rational choice paradigm. See, e.g., George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, 
De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67  AM. ECON. REV. 76, 77 (1977) (“The 
establishment  of  the  proposition  that  one  may  usefully  treat  tastes  as 
stable  over  time  and  similar  among  people  is  the  central  task  of  this 
essay.”).   See also  BECKER &  MURPHY,  supra note  76,  at  5  (“The  analytic 
approach relies on the assumptions of utility maximization and equilibrium 
in the behavior of groups, which are the traditional foundations of rational 
choice analysis and the economic approach to behavior.  This book shows 
how  to  incorporate  social  forces  into  this  approach.”)  and,  at  8  (“The 
approach we take treats the social environment as arguments, along with 
goods and services, in a stable extended utility function.”).
95
9
. Donald  Davidson,  Actions,  Reasons,  and  Causes, 60  J.  PHIL. 685, 
685–86 (1963),  reprinted in ACTIONS AND EVENTS 3 (Ernest LePore & Brian P. 
McLaughlin eds., 1985).
96 . Chapman supra note 13; Shafir et al., supra note 20.
97 . Scholars  from many disciplines study narrative.   Many,  including 
some  psychologists,  anthropologists  and  sociologists,  stress  the 
importance, if not primacy, of people organizing their worldviews, including 
their memories, using narratives.  See, e.g., DAN P. MCADAMS, THE STORIES WE 
LIVE BY: PERSONAL MYTHS AND THE MAKING OF THE SELF (1993); Jerome Bruner, Life as 
Narrative, 71 SOC. RES. 691 (2004).
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narratives are far from what might be commonly recognized 
as reasons.  Narrative plays a critical role in various social 
sciences.  One  important  function  of  narrative  is  to  help 
people  organize  their  world  views  and  justify  their 
decisions.98 Of course, my account is not intended to be a 
formal, fully-developed theory of preference; rather, it is the 
beginning  of  a  process-based  model,  in  which  important 
determinants of preference construction can be understood, 
and a preliminary  taxonomy of  such determinants  can be 
articulated.
The  way  people  make  choices  and  form  preferences 
importantly involves narrative.99 In my account, the critical 
determinant  of  preference  construction  is  narrative 
dependence.  The  simpler  the  narrative,  the  less  the 
preference is  narratively  dependent.  An example captures 
the  intuition:  My  narrative  about  why  I  like  chocolate  is 
comparatively simple. My narrative about why I wanted to be 
a law professor (or, for that matter, write about preferences) 
is decidedly more complex. The same can be said about my 
preferences  regarding  which  worthy  cause  I  want  the 
government  to  devote  scarce  resources  to—or,  more 
precisely, which ones I am willing to have it devote fewer or 
no resources to. I can easily imagine having a trajectory in 
which  my  career  or  article  choices  (or  sympathy  for  a 
particular worthy cause) were different. It is rather harder to 
imagine  how  I  would  come  not  to  have  liked  chocolate. 
Indeed,  filling  out  this  intuition,  more  narratively 
independent  preferences  tend  to  feel  unmediated;  the 
choice may involve a narrative, but the preference may not. 
By contrast, for more narratively dependent preferences, the 
preference—and  the  choice—are  apt  to  succeed  the 
narrative. Again, contrast chocolate with a career decision. 
My distinction harkens back to Aristotle, whose concept of 
“appetite” has much in common with my term “narratively 
independent preferences.”100
98
9
. See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 137–43 (1999) 
(discussing  the  function  of  explanations  and  story-telling  in  decision-
making).
99 . See generally MCADAMS, supra note 97 (providing a general account 
of how we make sense of the world and our experiences by constructing 
stories).
100
1
. Aristotle  distinguishes  between  Appetite  (epithumia),  ARISTOTLE,  DE 
ANIMA 414b5–6,  Passion  (Thumos),  ARISTOTLE,  POLITICS VII.6.1327b39ff,  and 
Wish, rational desire (boulesis), ARISTOTLE,  DE ANIMA 435a5–10.
Animals  have  appetites.   Passion  and  wish  require  rationality, 
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Almost all preferences are constructed: they do not exist 
to  be  discovered  or  revealed,  and  they  could  have  been 
otherwise.  But  some  are,  or  at  least  seem  to  be,  more 
constructed than others.  Indeed,  there  is  a  continuum;  at 
one  end  are  preferences  that  seem  comparatively 
narratively  independent,  such  as  biologically  hard-wired 
preferences, or preferences for ice cream, and on the other 
hand,  are  preferences  that  seem  far  more  narratively 
dependent, such as a choice of career. The more narratively 
independent the preference, the more fixed it is; the more 
narratively  dependent,  the  more  it  could  have  been 
otherwise.  This  is  not  to  say  that  narratively  dependent 
preferences are easy to change. To the contrary, narratively 
dependent preferences can be quite resistant to change if 
the  relevant  narrative  is  sufficiently  entrenched  (that  is, 
fixed). Consider in this regard the recent work on “cultural 
cognition”—“the  tendency  of  individuals  to  conform  their 
beliefs about disputed matters of fact (e.g., whether global 
warming  is  a  serious  threat;  whether  the  death  penalty 
deters murder; whether gun control makes society more safe 
or less) to values101 that define their cultural identities.”102 I 
have  written  on  an  overlapping  subject—identity  as 
perceptual lens.103 Both the work on cultural cognition and 
my  work  discuss  one  important  mechanism  by  which  a 
preference—for  a  particular  policy,  for  instance—remains 
entrenched.  An  individual’s  preference  is  anchored to  her 
identity;  her identity affects the way she takes in data. The 
passion because it involves seeing my acts and the acts of others 
as justified or unjustified (anger is a desire to return pain for pain 
because I see myself as unjustly injured).  Wish is desire in accord 
with the dictates of right reason.
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1111b8-9.
101
1
. The term “preference” is sometimes defined more inclusively, and 
sometimes less inclusively. Sometimes preferences are defined as choices; 
some definitions exclude values. I take the approach of Bowles, Sen and 
others  who  define  preferences  more  inclusively  to  include  choices  and 
values,  but  go  beyond  both.  Indeed,  the  definition  of  preference,  and 
distinctions between preference and choice,  turn out to  be critical.  See 
supra note 93 and accompanying text.
102 . The  Cultural  Cognition  Project  Home  Page, 
http://research.yale.edu  /culturalcognition/  (last  visited  Feb.  22,  2008) 
(“The Project . . . has an explicit normative objective: to identify processes 
of  democratic  decision-making  by  which  society  can  resolve  culturally 
grounded  differences  in  belief  in  a  manner  that  is  both  congenial  to 
persons  of  diverse  cultural  outlooks  and  consistent  with  sound  public 
policymaking.”).
103 . Claire A. Hill, The Law and Economics of Identity, 33 QUEEN’S L.J. 389 
(2007).
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way she takes in data thus serves to further entrench her 
preference  (as  well  as  her  identity).  Imagine  someone 
strongly opposed to gun control. She may think of herself as 
very peace-loving, pay far more attention to situations where 
guns killed innocent people than when people used guns to 
defend  themselves  against  crime,104 and  hence  have  her 
preference for gun control and her identity as a gun-control-
favoring-peace-loving-person affirmed.105
What  can  be  said  about  the  narratives?  In  particular, 
what  determines  whether  a  preference  is  more  or  less 
narratively  independent?  Preferences  themselves  and pro-
attitudes  can  be  lower-order,  about  tangible  things,  or 
higher-order, about more abstract values and wants. I prefer 
Hershey’s chocolate to Godiva chocolate. I also want to lead 
a virtuous life, a higher order preference. Narratives tend to 
importantly  include  instantiations  of  higher  order 
preferences. I want the Hershey’s chocolate in order to lead 
a pleasurable life. I want to exercise because it will make me 
have  a  longer  life.  But  of  course  there  is  a  higher  order 
preference favoring chocolate as well: the preference to do 
things one finds pleasant. If,  as in the Woody Allen movie 
Sleeper106 as  to  steak  and  hot  fudge  sundaes,  it  was 
discovered that chocolate is far better for health and weight 
control  than  previously  thought,  the  chocolate  preference 
would presumably win out far more often.
When I am asked whether I want to have society pay $X 
to save some forest, I construct my preference using some 
sort of narrative, probably relating to my desire to be a good 
citizen, or my desire to leave this planet in good condition 
for  the  next  generation.  Given  that  my  higher  order 
preference has many disparate realizations,  we should not 
be  surprised  to  observe  considerable  instability  and 
inconsistency when my (narratively quite dependent) lower-
order  preference  about  the  forest  is  elicited.  Context  and 
circumstance dictates which choice one makes when asked 
to do so; the choice is made against a backdrop of (probably 
conflicting) lower and higher order preferences. Indeed, the 
manner in which higher order preferences inform lower order 
104
1
. See generally DOUGLAS L. MEDIN, ET AL., COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 384–85 (4th 
ed. 2005) (discussing confirmation bias).
105 . See generally Hill, supra note  103; The Cultural Cognition Project, 
Mechanisms  of  Cultural  Cognition, 
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/ content/view/46/89/ (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2008).
106 . SLEEPER (Rollins-Joffe Productions 1973).
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preferences  is  exceedingly  complex,  and  pervades 
preference construction. It also pervades decision making, in 
the most profound ways, as I will discuss later in this Section.
Going  to  the  other  end  of  the  continuum,  the  least 
narratively  dependent  preferences  may  be  those 
preferences dictated or strongly influenced by biology. How 
narratively (in)dependent a preference is affects the extent 
to which it could have been, or could be, otherwise. Consider 
in this regard Owen Jones’s argument that law will need to 
work  harder  to  change  behavior  that  was  adaptive  in 
previous environments.107 On my account, Jones’s view is a 
special case of a more general phenomenon.  In this regard, 
interesting  work  by  Chen,  Lakshminarayanan  &  Santos, 
based  on  experiments  they  conducted  on  Capuchin 
monkeys,  argues  that  loss  aversion,  a  preference  for 
avoiding losses, is “innate and evolutionarily ancient.”108 The 
extent  to  which  preferences  are  hardwired  or  at  least  of 
ancient evolutionary origin may be much greater than many 
assume.  According to the authors:
While  our  results  are  by  no  means  definitive  proof  that  loss-
aversion is  innate in  humans,  to  the degree that  they  make us 
more likely to believe that some amount  of  this  behavior  has a 
biological component, they may have implications for how we treat 
loss-averse tendencies in human behavior.
For example, if these biases are innate, we may be more inclined 
to believe that they will persist in both common and novel settings, 
will be stable across time and cultures, and may endure even in the 
face of large individual costs, ample feedback, or repeated market 
disciplining.  This  would  greatly  constrain  both  the  potential  for 
successful policy intervention and the types of remedies available. 
In contrast, while a learned, noninnate heuristic may arise in many 
(if not all) cultures, we may not expect it to persist in settings in 
which it was highly suboptimal or in which market forces strongly 
discipline behavior. This would limit the potential scope and scale 
for welfare losses and may suggest that policy interventions that 
increase  feedback  or  learning  may  eliminate  what  losses  do 
exist.109
When we make a choice, what are we choosing among? 
Here, too, the traditional economists are quite wrong. Recall 
that  the  rational  choice  model  posits  a  complete  rank 
ordering of all things; the choice set therefore is or could be 
107
1
. Owen  D.  Jones,  Time-Shifted  Rationality  and  the  Law  of  Law’s 
Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
1141, 1190 (2001).
108 . M. Keith Chen et al.,  How Basic Are Behavioral Biases? Evidence 
from Capuchin Monkey Trading Behavior, 114 J. POL. ECON. 517, 520 (2006).
109 . Id. at 540.
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all  things,  and  our  preferences  would  not  (should  not) 
deviate. But in fact, what one is choosing among is not at all 
straightforward110—and the choice set matters a great deal. 
If one does not regard something as being in the choice set, 
one  might  not  think  to  choose  it;  I  discuss  in  Beyond 
Mistakes examples in which the composition of a choice set 
could  have  significant  ramifications  in  areas  important  to 
policy,  including  affirmative  action  and  cost-benefit 
analysis.111 Consider  Virginia  Postrel’s  discussion  of  a 
justification for affirmative action: that people choose among 
the “evoked set,” which is necessarily a subset of the full set 
and  are  hence  more  likely  to  choose  a  member  of  the 
evoked set.  Referring to an article in the  New York Times 
giving very short shift to African-American movie stars Will 
Smith and Wesley Snipes, she noted that “The evoked set of 
‘action  stars’  didn’t  overlap with  the evoked set  of  ‘black 
movie stars.’ There was no racial hostility at work, just the 
limits  of  human  minds  and  the  categories  they  create. 
Overcoming those limits is the argument for a certain type of 
affirmative action—not quotas or preferences, but an active 
effort to select from the full range of possible candidates, not 
merely the first evoked set.”112
Returning to more day-to-day examples: Do I put health-
club  membership  and  theater  subscription  in  the  same 
choice set?  I  may,  if  my aim is  to  choose what  to do on 
weekend evenings. But, I may not, depending on how I come 
to organize and view my choices, which in turn depends on 
many  factors,  including,  for  instance,  advertisements  and 
the behavior and views of my friends.  Indeed, until I wrote 
this paper, I never thought to put the two in the same choice 
set—but  I  will  probably  do  so  in  the  future.113 My  choice 
process here is intractably and profoundly path-dependent 
and dependent on mode of elicitation, because it turns on 
how I categorize, which itself depends on a path-dependent 
trajectory  that  could  have been otherwise.   Indeed,  many 
factors may influence whether the category “what I do on 
110
1
. See Markman et al., supra note 20, at 413–66. I discuss this point in 
Hill, supra note 16, at 581.
111 . Hill, supra note 16, at 582–83.
112 . Id. at 582.
113 . Cf. Markman & Medin, supra note 20, at 427 (“People may choose 
differently  depending  on  whether  they  are  retrieving  potential  options 
sequentially  and  accepting  or  rejecting  them  immediately  rather  than 
explicitly  comparing  a  set  of  options.  The  process  of  generation  and 
evaluation may differ substantially from comparative choice processes.”).
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weekend evenings” is meaningful to me, and what belongs 
in the category. (Feeding the cat? Bathing? Getting food at 
the supermarket?  Having  the radio  on? Having  it  on  to  a 
particular station?) Factors such as how regularly I  do the 
activity, how much time it takes, and how much prominence 
it has in my assessment of what I have done and what I am 
doing are all relevant.
Indeed,  what  we  put  in  a  choice  set—what  we  see 
ourselves as choosing among—is part of how we categorize 
the world. And we all do pervasively categorize; we need to 
categorize  in  order  to  make  sense  of  ourselves  and  our 
surroundings. Categorization is implicit in preferences: I have 
a  preference  for  things  falling  within  the  category  of 
“chocolate.”  I have a preference for activities falling within 
the  category  “activities  that  will  make  me  healthy.” 
Critically, as psychologists have noted and as I discussed at 
length  in  Beyond  Mistakes,  one’s  categories  and 
categorizations  are  somewhat  malleable.  No  pre-ordained 
group of categories is correct and relevant for everyone.
Moreover, except in rare cases, there are no necessary 
and sufficient conditions for any particular category. Rather, 
new  potential  category  members  are  judged  by  their 
perceived similarity to existing category members and the 
overarching concept of  the category.  Can the category  of 
“things that make me healthy” come to include a long fast 
motivated by political convictions? Can the category of “fun 
things” come to include vigorous physical exercise? Can the 
category of “delicious dessert” come to include carob cake? 
The inquiry seems a bit odd when it comes to preferences 
that  one  views  as  unmediated,  such  as  a  taste  for  a 
particular food.  But it seems far less odd in the context of 
lower-order  instantiations  for  higher  order  preferences.   I 
want to be sophisticated; I will prefer x activity insofar as I 
think  it  belongs  in  the  category  of  things  that  make  me 
sophisticated.  I would argue, though, that the mechanism is 
not so different even for many more unmediated seeming 
preferences: after all, one needs to be able to construct the 
narrative  of  one’s  preferences,  and  the  narrative  will 
categorize  the object of  preference within  the appropriate 
category (I liked this carob cake because it was delicious).
Applying  these  concepts  to  preferences,  consider  the 
interaction  between  preferences  for  particular  things  or 
activities  (lower-order  preferences)  and  higher  order 
preferences,  for  such  things  as  status  and  identity.  Am I 
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willing to pay $125 for a pair of black jeans made by Gap? It 
may depend on whether Gap’s ads manage to persuade me 
that the jeans are what cool people will be wearing this year. 
How much will I charge to paint a fence? If I encounter Tom 
Sawyer,  who persuades me that painting a fence is really 
fun,  I  might  even  pay  to  do  so  rather  than  asking  for 
payment.114 The question becomes whether I  come to see 
something  lower-order  as  fulfilling  the  higher-order 
preference. The jeans are “cool,” a member of the category 
of  “cool  things.”  Fence-painting has become a member of 
the  category  of  activities  I  do  for  fun.   It  may  be  that  I 
previously thought fence painting might be fun, I may have 
had no view, or I may even have thought that it was not fun, 
but  was  somehow  amenable  to  being  persuaded 
otherwise.115
Higher order and lower order preferences are frequently 
intertwined. How does Smith know how much he values a 
particular stereo? He may like the way it sounds, and prefer 
it to the equivalent amount of cash it costs.  But part of his 
assessment may turn on how he wants to think of himself, or 
how he wants others to think of him. Does he want to think 
of himself as “the guy who spent $50,000 on a stereo when 
people are starving in Africa?” If he spends $50,000 on the 
stereo,  will  he  think  of  himself  this  way?  The  answers  to 
these questions will affect Smith’s preferences.
The indeterminacy plays out slightly differently in a very 
societally-oriented higher order preference, such as the one 
for status.  What confers status is established in a complex 
interaction  between  people  and  society.   Ex  ante,  it  is 
impossible  to  know  what  will  be  in  the  set  of  status-
conferring items and activities. When I was much younger, in 
my social  circles it  was generally  necessary (although not 
sufficient)  to own some particular  set of  record albums, a 
pair of narrow-vale corduroy pants, a pair of black jeans and 
a pair of blue jeans if one wanted to have even the most 
minimal level of status.  And of course, what gives status is 
114
1
. See Ariely, Tom Sawyer, supra note 3, at 1–2. Or maybe somebody 
can  persuade  me  that  painting  the  fence  will  nicely  complement  my 
otherwise too cerebral lifestyle, helping me achieve a healthier and better-
rounded life.
115 . A perhaps facetious example: when I was younger, I was talked out 
of liking the song “If You Could Read My Mind” by Gordon Lightfoot—a song 
I was not 100% sure I liked—on grounds that only sappy people liked such 
songs.   I  recall  clearly going from experiencing pleasure at  hearing the 
song to experiencing annoyance and disdain.
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in a state of flux.  Last year’s “it” wardrobe was, well, so last 
year.
Given indeterminate lower order preferences and more 
determinate  higher  preferences,  how  do  people  make 
choices?  There  are  many factors—including  many that  do 
not relate in any straightforward manner to fundamentals. 
Whether Jones will be tempted to buy item A may turn on 
how  item A  is  depicted  and  by  whom (a  close  friend?  A 
popular  celebrity?  A billboard  in  Podunk?),  and how Jones 
views herself (as an early adopter? As a luddite? As Spartan? 
As  self-indulgent?).  Recall,  too,  the  Tom  Sawyer  example 
above.  Tom has  to  paint  the  fence.  He  offers  others  the 
opportunity to paint the fence, telling them it will be fun.116 
The others take him up on the opportunity and do have fun. 
Perhaps, had somebody required them to paint a fence the 
day before they encountered Tom, or indeed, had somebody 
paid them to do so, they would not have experienced it as 
fun. It is hard to know. In one experiment, people valued a 
bottle of wine differently depending on an anchor they knew 
to  be  arbitrary:  their  own  social  security  numbers.117 The 
message is not that people can be manipulated into any old 
preference. It is rather that there is considerable room for 
various influences.  It  is  hard to imagine that  most  people 
would  pay  to  be  tortured118.  But  how is  painting  a  fence 
distinguishable  from  many  forms  of  exercise  that  people 
report  experiencing  as  pleasant?  (And  how  would  those 
people  experience  exercise  if,  as  mentioned  above,  the 
prediction in Woody Allen’s Sleeper came true, and it turned 
out that people should have been lethargic couch potatoes 
eating  steak  and  hot  fudge  sundaes  and  smoking 
cigarettes?).  Consider,  too,  the  concept  of  forbidden 
pleasures. Is there an extra thrill for an underage drinker to 
be flouting the law? Is there an extra thrill for an accountant 
to “come close to the line” in an accounting determination? 
(And if so, what does this say about where the line should 
be?)
Contrast the picture I have painted thus far with a more 
traditional  economic picture of  decision-making.  The more 
116
1
. See Ariely, Tom Sawyer, supra note 3, at 1–2.
117 . See Ariely, Coherent Arbitrariness, supra note 3, at 76.
118 . There  may,  however,  be  some:  psychological  manuals,  and 
anecdotal accounts describe some people as drawn to behaviors that to 
most people would seem quite horrible; consider in this regard the movie 
The Night Porter.
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traditional  picture  involves  acquiring  and  verifying 
information pre-labeled as such, narrowly responsive to the 
decision-making  task,  until  the  costs  of  getting  more 
information exceed the benefits. By contrast,  the picture I 
have painted is far less tractable. In many decisions, even 
some simple ones, what’s important and relevant is not clear 
at the outset; the decision may depend on a trajectory that 
could  have  been  otherwise.  Consider  my  digital  camera 
example  discussed  above;  even  the  process  of  making 
apparently  simple  consumer  choices  is  not  so  simple. 
Consider  my  descriptions  in  Section  4  of  decisions  about 
shampoo  and  clothing.  As  Douglas  Kysar  notes, 
“[i]ndividuals in contemporary consumer cultures . . . define 
their values, aspirations, and identities by reference to the 
goods they consume, the leisure activities they undertake, 
and the locations to which they travel.”119
Indeed,  preferences  and  identity  are  inextricably 
intertwined. I may, for instance, learn about how I balance 
frugality and health when I choose a much cheaper product 
that is a bit less healthy than a much more expensive one.120 
I may learn that I am not good at retaining technical details 
when  I  compare  my  choice  process  in  buying  a  digital 
camera with that  of  somebody else.  How much I  like and 
want  a  particular  article  of  clothing  may  turn  on  how  I 
resolve  the  conflict  between  wanting  to  be  stylish  and 
feeling that I and others will think me frivolous for caring and 
for wasting time informing myself as to what it takes to be 
stylish.
Moreover,  Barry  Schwartz  argues  that  people  may  be 
more apt to feel regret when confronted with many choices; 
119
1
. Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1700, 1758 (2003).
120 . In this regard, see the (perhaps semi-facetious) description of this 
issue in a recent Op-Ed in the New York Times.
A friend in Seattle—I’ll call him Mitch, because that is his name—
reports a full-scale identity crisis in the toothpaste aisle. There he 
stood,  two  coupons  in  hand.  Was  he  ready  to  become  a 
rejuvenating-effects, tartar-protection kind of guy, or was he wed 
to the fight against tobacco stains? And to think it all used to boil 
down to squeezing from the bottom. The transformative power is 
dizzying.
Stacy Schiff, Op-Ed., One Nation, With Niches for All,  N.Y. TIMES,  June 11, 
2005, at A13.
The author continues, echoing another of Schwartz’s points: “The pressure 
is on; the paralysis sets in.”  Id.;  see also Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 489, 491 (discussing a 
related topic: signaling to one’s self in order to learn about one’s self).
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whatever they choose, they know of many other things they 
could  have done that  might  have made them happier. 121 
There  is  some  evidence  suggesting  that  regret  also 
implicates  identity  concerns:  that  “people  care  not  only 
about the relative outcomes of a decision but also what the 
chosen outcome implies for their  own self-evaluation as a 
competent, intelligent person.”122 Somebody choosing not to 
take  money  offered  in  exchange  for  her  blood  may  feel 
better about herself than if she had never been offered the 
money. Somebody may choose not to provide blood if doing 
so becomes associated with money exchanges rather than 
altruism, whether or not she would be paid.
George Loewenstein recounts another example. A couple 
was  ready  to  attend  a  daytime  event  to  which  they  had 
obtained a much-coveted  invitation.  They had a  fourteen-
year-old daughter who they had intended to leave at home 
alone.  Somebody  else,  somebody  they  had  no  reason  to 
suppose they would encounter again, who was also about to 
attend the event asked them “do you think it is safe to leave 
your  daughter  alone?”123 They realized that,  whatever the 
answer to the question, once it had been raised, they had to 
stay home. The downside of something happening after they 
had  been  warned  would  be  too  horrible.  Presumably,  the 
question made salient not just what others would think of 
them if  something  happened  to  their  daughter,  but  what 
they would think about themselves.
These  examples  suggest  that  decision  making  is 
complex in ways that count—it is a way that people come to 
learn and convey to others, who they are. It is critical not to 
make too much of this observation, of course. It  is not as 
though  each  visit  to  a  supermarket  involves  complicated 
soul-searching.  But  in  some  cases,  thinking  about  a 
phenomenon in a way that takes more of a meta-perspective 
may be helpful.
But is my account at all  tractable,  or is it a wholesale 
abandonment  of  any  parsimony  whatsoever?  While  it  will 
necessarily be more complex than the traditional account, it 
121
1
. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 71, at 147–65.
122 . George  Loewenstein  &  Jennifer  Lerner,  The  Role  of  Affect  in 
Decision  Making,  in THE HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCE 619,  624 (Richard  J. 
Davidson et  al.  eds.,  2003)  (describing the experiments  building in  this 
assumption).
123 . Telephone Interview with George Loewenstein, Professor of Econ. & 
Psychology, Carnegie Mellon Univ., in Pittsburgh Pa. (Aug., 2004).
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does have some key unifying themes. The principal one is 
that decision-making as I have described it is less costly than 
the  traditional  alternative.  Interestingly,  in  the  traditional 
account  with  fixed  preferences,  the  transaction  costs  of 
determining  what  exists  and  doing  the  rank  ordering  are 
given short shrift—and this does not even take into account 
the  costs  of  retrieving  the  rank  ordering.  My  account 
hypothesizes  that  a  methodology  that  forms  preferences 
(only)  as  needed  minimizes  costs.  The  next  inquiry,  of 
course,  is  how  we  can  determine  what  the  methodology 
might be: how the narratives form decision “rules.” The task 
is difficult but by no means insurmountable. We might, for 
instance, be able to formulate conditions under which money 
might be presumptively preferred over many,  if  not most, 
alternatives.  I  suggested earlier  that  we might  be able  to 
figure out which preferences might be more or less stable. 
An inquiry for determinants or presumptive determinants of 
preferences and choices might be fruitful indeed.  A critical 
question, too, is how consequential  a decision is. The less 
consequential  the  decision,  the  more  we  might  expect  a 
decision  rule  mainly  focused  on  minimizing  the  actual 
decision-making costs.
Whatever else a more nuanced and realistic account of 
preferences  and  preference  construction  does,  it  should 
leave in place as a special case the many preferences that, 
through  hard-wiring  or  some  other  reason,  can  safely  be 
treated as fixed.  Such an account also should be willing to 
sacrifice nuance for parsimony in appropriate circumstances. 
We are far from knowing how to construct such an account. 
But  descriptive  shortcomings  of  the  existing  account, 
burgeoning  research  on  determinants  of  preferences,  and 
the existing account’s weakening normative claims all argue 
in favor of proceeding to that end.
5. WHAT FOLLOWS?
The  foregoing  argues  that  preference  construction  is 
rational; it argues, as well, that there are many mechanisms 
by which preferences are constructed. It offers a preliminary 
sketch  of  some  core  features  of  preference  construction: 
that  preferences are often not about traditional  objects of 
choice;  that  there  is  a  continuum  from  narrative 
independence to narrative dependence; and that narrative 
dependence  importantly  implicates  a  link  between  a 
particular choice and a higher level preference. It  offers a 
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brief consideration of the determinants of the narratives as 
well as a sense of which ones might tend to be more stable. 
Clearly, all this is quite preliminary; it will take a great deal 
to make this diffuse account at a high level of generality and 
abstraction into a more tractable account. That being said, I 
discuss here several contexts in which my account may have 
some application.
A) THE DEBATE BETWEEN THE LIBERTARIANS AND THE NEW PATERNALISTS
Libertarians (“anti-paternalists”) argue that government 
ought  not  to  be  paternalistic:  people  know  better  than 
government what is good for them, and in any event, are 
entitled to  choose what  they do,  so long as  they are not 
hurting  others.  The  new  paternalists  argue  that  because 
people  make  mistakes  and  because  preferences  are 
constructed,  paternalistic-seeming interventions (ideally,  in 
the  form  of  “soft”  paternalism,  de-biasing  or  providing 
information rather than sanctioning bad choices) might be 
consistent with what people really want and hence might be 
consistent with libertarianism. As I argued in my paper Anti-
Anti-Anti Paternalism,124 the new paternalists have it wrong 
in  an  important  respect.  There  is  indeed  reason,  as  they 
argue, to think that people’s choices may not be what they 
really want—but there is no reason to think we have access 
to or the ability to give what people really want when we 
choose a policy intervention designed to affect their choices 
(or preferences). That preferences are constructed does not 
indicate  that  the  government  can  figure  out  some  true 
underlying unmediated preference and honor “what people 
really want” by promoting that preference. The notion of an 
unmediated  preference  is  untenable  and  incoherent.  That 
the new paternalists are wrong on this point does not help 
the anti-paternalists, though: the anti-paternalists think that 
what people really want is by definition what they choose, 
and that  people’s  choices  should therefore be sacrosanct; 
that preferences are constructed shows that their position is 
also untenable.
Still,  the  new  paternalists  may  offer  plausible  policy 
prescriptions even though they cannot justify paternalism on 
libertarian  grounds.  They  argue correctly  that  there  is  no 
pure  way  to  respect  “choices.”  Choices  are  necessarily 
124
1
. Hill, supra note 32.
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dictated by context, including the applicable default rules125
—they are always constructed.  It follows, then, that trying to 
influence  what  people  do,  whether  by  sanction  or  by 
something  softer,  does  not  constitute  some impermissible 
interference with people doing what they really want. Again, 
what people choose is a complicated mix, arising from what 
is often a path dependent trajectory.  That preferences are 
constructed suggests that there is no clear way for law to 
respect what people really want—and that trying to respect 
what people really want ought not to trump other legitimate 
societal aims.
B) CONTINGENT VALUATION
We  need  to  value  harms  to  quality  of  life  such  as 
environmental harms; we have significant trouble doing so. 
One typical method, contingent valuation, provides a notable 
and notorious example. It  is characterized by inconsistent, 
incoherent  and  impossible  valuations—saving  forest  A  is 
valued at $X, but saving all forests in a region might also be 
valued  at  $X,  the  same  amount;  saving  all  forests  in  a 
particular country might be valued at an amount equal to, 
for instance, some large fraction of the country’s GDP and 
saving forests and lakes might be valued at an amount that 
is a large multiple of GDP.126
125
1
. The default rule is not just influential because it is easiest to go 
along with. Indeed, there is evidence that a default rule or option is seen as 
being endorsed by the people or entities responsible for offering the option
—often,  the  government.   See,  e.g., Craig  R.  M.  McKenzie  et  al., 
Recommendations Implicit in Policy Defaults, 17 PSYCH. SCI. 414, 414 (2006) 
(“The results  [of  the experiments  discussed in  the article]  indicate that 
default  effects  occur  in  part  because  policymakers’  attitudes  can  be 
revealed through their choice of default, and people perceive the default as 
indicating   the  recommended  course  of  action.”).  A  notable  example 
discussed in the article is the differing rates of organ donation in countries 
where one has to opt in to donate versus countries where one has to opt 
out not to donate.  The donation rates in the opt out countries are much 
higher. See Sheldon Zink, PhD, Rachel Zeehandelaar and Stacey Wertlieb, 
MBe, Presumed versus Expressed Consent in the US and Internationally, 7 
VIRTUAL MENTOR:  AMA  J.  ETHICS,,Sept.  2005,  http://virtualmentor.ama-
assn.org/2005/09/pfor2-0509.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2008).
126 . The writing on contingent valuation is voluminous.  See generally 
Daniel  Kahneman,  The  Review  Panel’s  Assessment:  Comments  by 
Professor  Daniel  Kahneman,  in VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS 180, 185–94 
(Ronald G. Cummings et al. eds., 1986); Daniel Kahneman et al., Economic 
Preferences Or Attitude Expressions?: An Analysis of Dollar Responses to 
Public  Issues,  19  J.  RISK &  UNCERTAINTY 203,  204  (1999)  (arguing  that 
contingent  valuations are better  understood  as  expressions  of  attitudes 
than as indications of economic preference).
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My  account  of  preference  construction  suggests  that 
these  types  of  valuations  should  be  particularly  unstable. 
The  traditional  observation—  they  represent  cheap  talk, 
because the people who are being asked their valuation are 
not typically being asked to write checks to pay their pro 
rata portion of the amount they mention—is clearly correct. 
But the traditional observation leaves something important 
unexplained.  Why should people’s valuations be as unstable 
and inconsistent as they are? It is because they appeal to 
several  higher  order  values—as  to  each  of  these  values, 
there are many disparate realizations—and, in most cases, 
there is no reason to anchor one realization in a lasting way. 
Civic mindedness, caring for future generations, caring for all 
creatures,  caring for  rich  and poor,  respect  for  something 
greater  than  oneself,  etc.—all  are  possible  candidates  for 
higher  order  values  one might  have,  and,  again,  all  have 
disparate  realizations.  Is  there a way to limit  or  eliminate 
harmful  instability  in  this  context?  Absent  something  to 
ground one or the other—the need to write a check, some 
story that somehow sticks about one’s life, etc.—specifics of 
the presentation may make all the difference. What if people 
are asked to write checks? They might provide a coherent 
rank-ordering, but one that might nevertheless be unstable.
Indeed,  making  money  valuations  can  itself  shape 
preferences. People might value something differently when 
money  is  taken  out  of  the  picture.   The  intuition  is 
straightforward:  people  may  donate  blood  if  asked  when 
they  would  never  “sell”  it.127  Putting  a  price  tag  on 
something may lead to viewing it as something that is paid 
for—and something weighted against other things that are 
paid for.  In one experiment, parents picked up their children 
later from a day care center after monetary penalties were 
instituted for late pick-ups.  Paying money transformed the 
late pick-up from something they should not do to something 
they could pay to do.128  Another experiment demonstrated 
127
1
. The seminal work making the point in general and discussing the 
blood example is RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP (1970).
128
1
. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 1 
(2000).  This paper has been criticized on many grounds, including as to 
the  methodology  used  in  the  experiment.  See,  e.g.,  posting  of  Bryan 
Kaplan  to  EconLog, 
http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2005/10/revenge_of_the.html  (Oct.  27, 
2005).  However,  the  existence  of  the  phenomenon  it  describes  is 
commonly accepted.  See TITMUSS, supra note  127;  see generally Bruno S. 
Frey & Felix  Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost  of  Price Incentives:  An Empirical  
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that  “support  for  a  noxious  facility  [a  repository  to  store 
nuclear waste] decreased when monetary compensation to 
host it was offered.”129 Intrinsic motivations to do the civic-
minded thing were crowded out.130  Again, in all these cases, 
higher order values are coming into play, and are implicated 
differently  with  respect  to  the  same  action  in  different 
contexts.
C) NEGOTIATIONS OF COMPLEX BUSINESS CONTRACTS
Consider  complex  business  contracting  for  major 
transactions  such  as  mergers  and  acquisitions.  In  the 
traditional  picture,  the  endeavor  is  construed  narrowly: 
parties  are  straightforwardly  and  purposively  engaged  in 
acquisition of particular information as to the subject matter 
at issue. The focus is largely on ferreting out the truth from 
people who know it but have an interest in not revealing it.131 
Necessarily,  such  inquiries  are  quite  tractable:  what  is 
needed is  a truth-revelation mechanism. Party X, deciding 
whether to buy a share of a business from party Y, and if so, 
on what terms, needs credible information that the business 
is not a lemon. Perhaps Y can provide information that X can 
verify to her satisfaction, or a credible signal. Or perhaps a 
third party will rent her reputation to assure party X that the 
business is not a lemon. Whether the business is a lemon is 
a matter of fact; the only problem the parties face is that Y 
has an incentive to depict her business as not being a lemon 
whether or  not  it  is.  Even where the key issue is  not  Y’s 
superior information and adverse incentives in relation to X, 
but information  that  neither  X nor  Y may have, economic 
analyses  typically  treat  the  information  as  mechanically 
elicitable  via  directed  inquiry.132 Perhaps  specialists  can 
obtain the information (for instance, that a transaction is, or 
is not, valid under applicable law).
In  this  picture,  the  lawyer  is  helping  in  information 
acquisition  and  verification.  He  knows,  through  long 
Analysis of  Motivation Crowding Out,  87  AM.  ECON.  REV.  746 (1997);  TYLER 
COWEN, DISCOVER YOUR INNER ECONOMIST (2007) (discussing how  one’s children are 
less likely to do the family dishes if they are paid to do so and hence feel 
it’s  a  market  transaction than if  they’re  not paid and are told it’s  their 
family responsibility); Hill, supra note 103, at 418–21.
129
1
. Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 128, at 753.
130 . Id.; see also Hill, supra note 103.
131 . See Hill,  supra note 16, at 569–70 (critiquing the overemphasis on 
this type of “lemons” inquiry).
132 . Hill, supra note 16.
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experience, what information to seek, how to seek it,  and 
what verification techniques are available and appropriate.133 
The  parties  listen  to  the  problems  and  solutions  and 
negotiate  until  they  reach  the  one  that  best  meets  their 
needs.  But  this  picture  is  hard  to  reconcile  with  the  real 
world. Long, ponderous negotiations with attention paid to 
every semi-colon are a stark contrast to what happens when 
the  deal  is  done:  the  transaction  documents  go  into  a 
drawer, to be taken out only if the parties stop getting along. 
And  what  of  all  that  time  spent  during  the  negotiations 
arguing over each word? All  lawyers would agree that the 
transaction  documents,  written  under  enormous  time 
pressure  by  sleep  deprived  junior  lawyers,  surely  are  not 
models of clarity to help judges figure out what the parties’ 
deal is—yet nobody goes back and fixes the document (or 
the  system,  which  inevitably  produces  documents  of  this 
sort).134 Indeed, if the parties should cease getting along, the 
chance  that  there  will  be  something  in  the  transaction 
documents that allows them to impose costs on the other in 
some legal process is exceedingly high. Why is this?135
One  area  of  particularly  contentious  negotiation  is 
planning for contingencies,  especially  those that  would be 
undesirable  for  one  or  both  parties.  How  will  the  parties 
proceed if the business does poorly? What if one party wants 
to terminate the arrangement or buy the other out, or be 
bought  out?  Notwithstanding  that  the  parties  may  be 
experienced  business  people,  discussions  on  these  issues 
often  do  not  seem  like  dispassionate  consideration  and 
discussion of the various options the lawyer(s) present. Why 
not?
133
1
. Ronald Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and 
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984). Gilson argues that
[l]awyers function as transaction cost engineers,  devising efficient 
mechanisms which bridge the gap between capital  asset  pricing 
theory’s hypothetical world of perfect markets and the less-than-
perfect  reality  of  effecting  transactions  in  this  world.  Value  is 
created when the transactional structure designed by the business 
lawyer  allows  the  parties  to  act,  for  that  transaction,  as  if  the 
assumption on which the capital asset pricing theory is based were 
accurate.
 Id. at 255.
134 . See Hill & King, supra note 71 (describing this dynamic).
135 . I am presently writing an account of this phenomenon. Claire A. Hill, 
Bargaining  in  the  Shadow  of  the  Lawsuit:  A  Social  Norms  Theory  of 
Incomplete Contracts (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Minnesota 
Journal of Law, Science & Technology).
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An analogy to a marriage may be instructive. Imagine 
two  people  who  are  engaged  to  be  married  consulting  a 
lawyer about a prenuptial agreement. Each party has chosen 
a partner. Each has decided he or she can get along well 
enough  with  the  other  –  but  the  “closing”  has  not  yet 
occurred.   In  the  discussions  with  the  lawyer,  each  is 
conveying the sort of person he or she is. If one or both of 
them have a well-thought-out plan for making sure they get 
their “due” should the relationship dissolve, this in itself will 
provide considerable information to the other party. It may 
also  provide  information  to  themselves  about  their  own 
priorities and outlook.
In  both  cases—the  transaction  and  the  marriage—the 
parties do have preferences as to the terms they want. But 
the negotiations as to charged matters (the principal matters 
negotiated  for  pre-nuptial  agreements;  such  matters  are 
typically  less  prominent  in  transaction  negotiations)  are 
occurring simultaneously with many other things. Each party 
is deciding on the terms—but each is also deciding whether 
to deal with the other party at all—what kind of person the 
other person is based on how the other is acting, what kinds 
of points the other is stressing, what kinds of contingencies 
the  other  thinks  warrants  addressing  and  how  the  other 
party is proposing addressing them, and so on. (Admittedly, 
the  parties  discussing  the  pre-nuptial  agreement  are,  we 
hope,  more  committed  to  one  another  than  the  parties 
negotiating  their  contract  are  at  the  early  stages  of  the 
negotiation.)  Each party  is  also  learning  about  itself.  How 
conciliatory is it? How much does it have at stake in getting 
its way?
On this  view,  the  lawyers  need to  be  a  bit  careful  in 
bringing up less likely and unpleasant contingencies. There 
may  be  a  real  cost  as  they  are  negotiated,  without  a 
commensurate  benefit.  Should  the  parties  get  along  the 
contentious  clause  may  not  be  needed—the  parties  will 
probably  come up with  an accommodation  that  works  for 
both of them. And should the parties not get along, they will 
probably each have an argument that whatever the contract 
may say, they are entitled to something better. Why might 
lawyers  push  for  negotiations  on  these  types  of 
contingencies  beyond  what  might  be  in  their  clients’ 
interests?  There  is  something  to  be  explained,  especially 
since  in  comparable  complex  business  transacting  in 
Germany, contentious negotiations over contingencies is not 
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the norm.136 My argument in an article I  wrote with a co-
author comparing German contracting practices with those 
in the United States turns on lawyer agency costs. The U.S. 
lawyers use forms that include every contingency they have 
encountered—firms compete in part based on how inclusive 
their forms are. There is no payoff to a lean and mean form; 
there  is,  however,  a  considerable  cost  to  not  including  a 
contingency, even a remote one (but how would one know it 
was remote?), that arises. By contrast, in Germany lawyers 
use short contracts; the contracts are largely standardized, 
and  different  firms  use  the  same  forms.  The  U.S.  norm 
involves  aggressive  lawyers,  zealous  advocates  for  their 
clients.  In  Germany,  a  lawyer  who  negotiated  in  the 
American  style  would  be  reviled.  There  are  salient 
differences in the court system as well. But the bottom line 
is  that  in  both  countries,  parties  have  preferences  for 
particular terms of their contracts, but their negotiations can 
scarcely be properly or even importantly depicted as neutral 
exchanges  of  direct  and  indirect  information  about  those 
terms.  The  terms  are  the  wrong  unit  of  account—the 
preferences concern the terms but also higher order matters 
as to the parties’ relationship.
6. CONCLUSION
The  debate  as  to  whether  preferences  are  fixed, 
amenable  to  discovery  and  revelation,  pits  economists 
against scholars from many other disciplines. There are two 
polar positions: preferences are fixed, and preferences are 
infinitely  malleable.  Clearly,  the  truth  lies  somewhere  in 
between. Indeed, it is important not to caricature the neo-
classical  economists’  view.  Presumably  most  sensible 
economists would admit that hyper-determinate preferences 
of traditional objects of choice are an extreme simplification 
needed to make the model parsimonious and the modeling 
tractable.  But  once  a  deviation  is  sufficiently  large  and 
important,  as  is  the  case  with  the  construction  of 
preferences,  some  sacrifice  to  parsimony  and  tractability 
becomes a reasonable price to pay for increased explanatory 
and predictive power.
This article sets forth the beginnings of a framework for 
understanding  preference  construction,  a  process-based 
model.  Behavioral  science  is  actively  studying  specific 
136
1
. Id.
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determinants and mechanisms of preference construction; I 
propose here a complementary, but more general, account. I 
do so here as part  of  a broader endeavor,  to  re-conceive 
rationality according to Herbert Simon’s view, that context-
dependence and other complexities will necessarily be part 
of  the  story.137 Indeed,  preference  construction,  while 
challenging  the  traditional  law  and  economics  model,  fits 
well  into  Simon’s  conception  of  rationality.  It  does  not  fit 
nearly as well into the thus-far dominant behavioral law and 
economics  model  that  emphasizes  law  and  economics’ 
failure  to  acknowledge  that  people  sometimes  make 
mistakes and sometimes are altruistic.
How are preferences constructed? The role of  narrative 
is  key.  Contrast  preferences that may feel  immediate and 
unmediated with those that feel more as though they require 
deliberation.  In the former cases, the preference precedes 
the  narrative—if  somebody  asks  a  person  why  she  likes 
chocolate, her answer may be “well, because I do.” I fit liking 
chocolate  and  seeking  chocolate  into  my  view  of  myself, 
others, and the world but my experience with the chocolate 
is  apparently  narrative-independent.  Contrast  this  with  a 
case where I am trying to figure out whether a particular suit 
makes  me  look  professional.  In  the  latter  case,  the 
preference  may  be  simultaneous  with,  or  succeed,  the 
narrative.
What are people doing when they make a choice? Here, 
again  is  where  the  economists’  paradigm,  of  traditional 
objects  of  choice,  revealed  through  action,  leads  them 
astray. People’s preferences may be for traditional objects of 
choice, or they may be for something higher-order that they 
have  concluded  is  well  instantiated  and  realized  by  the 
traditional  object  of  choice.  Again,  I  may prefer  chocolate 
because—well, because I prefer chocolate. But I may prefer 
a particular sports car because I think it makes me be, and 
seem,  daring,  and  I  have  a  preference  to  be  and  seem 
daring. Indeed, economics more recently is exploring higher 
order preferences—including the preference for status and 
esteem,138 and, in the last few years, preferences relating to 
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. See  generally Herbert  A.  Simon,  Rationality  in  Psychology  and 
Economics, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 25–
40 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin Reder eds., 1986).
138 . See, e.g.,  ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER (1999); Richard H. McAdams, 
Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1 (1992).
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identity.139 Higher order preferences appreciably complicate 
analyses of preferences, and in particular, the ability to rank-
order  in  a  stable  and  coherent  manner.  What  satisfies  a 
preference  for  status?  What  satisfies  a  preference  for 
enhancing one’s  sense of  gender or racial  identity? These 
questions are increasingly being explored.
Law needs to care about the construction of preferences. 
After  all,  law  seeks  to  influence  preferences,  through 
education,  public  interest  campaigns  and  public 
announcements,  as  well  in  more  traditional  ways,  using 
punishments  and rewards.  Thus,  law  ought  to  understand 
more about how preferences are constructed.  Moreover, law 
seeks  to  reflect  the  citizenry’s  preferences;  again,  if 
preferences differ depending on how they are elicited, the 
consequences for law are considerable.
One of these consequences concerns how the law ought 
to try to influence behavior. At a very basic level: jail or fines 
are used to discourage disfavored conduct because people 
dislike both considerably. Rewards and recognition are used 
to  encourage  favored  conduct  because  people  like  both 
considerably. Jail, fines, rewards and recognition—especially 
the  first  three—may  implicate  near—universal  first  order 
preferences. While there are apparently people who want to 
go to  jail,  it  is  a  fairly  safe  assumption  that  most  people 
would do quite a bit to avoid doing so.
But what should be done about behavior  that  the law 
wants to encourage or discourage, when classic means are 
either unavailable or can be usefully complemented? Public 
interest campaigns and other uses of law that seek to shape 
norms  should  be  crafted  mindful  of  how  people  form 
preferences.  More profoundly,  insofar  as  satisfying certain 
types of preferences may be socially problematic, should the 
government  consider  means  to  discourage  such 
preferences?  These sorts of inquiries are increasingly being 
made; they can be better informed if we have a better sense 
of how preferences are constructed.
Indeed, the relationship between higher and lower order 
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preferences suggests other applications. Lawmakers want to 
do  what  their  constituents  desire,  even if  only  to  get  re-
elected. That people wildly and inconsistently overvalue (and 
at  other  times,  undervalue)  environmental  benefits  is  a 
source of  frustration in this  regard:  what do people  want, 
and how much are they willing to pay for  it?  My account 
suggests  reasons why cheap talk  and cheap sentiment  in 
this area are so pervasive and why more realistic valuations 
are  so  difficult  to  achieve:  higher  order  preferences  are 
strongly  implicated,  but  not  readily  or  stably  translatable 
into particular lower order preferences.
My account here suggests some critical determinants of 
preference construction. The economics literature focuses on 
traditional  objects  of  choice  (such  as  consumer  goods  or 
leisure activities): in other words, lower order preferences. 
But  people  have  higher  order  preferences  as  well: 
preferences  as  to  what  sort  of  preferences  they  want  to 
have, what sort of person they wish to be, and preferences 
for  abstract  values.140 Their  lower-order  preferences  are 
often  informed by higher-order  considerations.  Part  of  my 
wanting  to  go  snorkeling  involves  my  having  categorized 
snorkeling  as  an  activity  within  the  category  of  “things 
people do for fun.” Preferences are constructed when people 
come  to  see  particular  choices  as  reflecting  their  higher 
order preferences. This is of course not to say either that all 
preferences are constructed or that preferences are infinitely 
malleable.  Rather,  it  is  to  take  a  middle  ground position; 
some  preferences  are  determined  in  path-dependent 
trajectories,  and  the  trajectories  themselves  are  of 
considerable  analytic  interest.  All  this  might  seem  to 
abandon  parsimony  altogether.  But  I  am  optimistic  that 
traditional  economic  principles  of  cost-minimization  can 
help; it may be that decision rules and presumptive decision 
rules  we  can  identify  serve  much  of  the  function  fixed 
preferences have served.
The agenda I propose is exceedingly difficult, and poses 
serious analytic challenges.  Indeed, I readily acknowledge 
that my descriptive position here complicates the normative 
task a policymaker faces. What role should preferences play 
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these two types of preferences. Happiness is clearly higher-order; Wheaties 
are probably lower-order. But what about a preference for better health vs. 
a preference for curing cancer? But there are enough clear cases that the 
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in  policy  if  they  are  constructed  in  the  way,  and  to  the 
extent, that I describe? How do we know what to encourage? 
How  do  we  know  when  people  are  better  off?  The 
neoclassical  paradigm  offers  ways  of  addressing  these 
issues;  my  alternative  thus  far  does  not.   But  if  the 
neoclassical paradigm’s answers are wrong, and significantly 
so,  are  they  actually  much  better  than  indeterminate 
answers that might be justifiable on pragmatic grounds, or 
using  “local”  rather  than  overarching  principles?   Much 
research needs to be done, and the task is daunting indeed. 
However,  there does not  seem to be a viable  alternative. 
Certainly, the neoclassical framework ought to be preserved 
to the extent possible; indeed, it seems likely that it is not 
infrequently  right  in  many  matters  that  lawmakers  might 
care about.  But a richer account that accords better with 
descriptive reality as well as intuition offers the promise of 
better policymaking, grounded in an understanding of how 
people really  do form their  preferences, and a recognition 
that doing so other than in accordance with the neoclassical 
model is not necessarily, or even typically, irrational.
To  conclude,  I  echo  the  words  of  psychologists 
Risekamp, Busemeyer and Mellers:
Debates  about  rationality  focus  attention  far  too  narrowly.   A 
broader  conversation—one  that  considers  reasonable  behavior, 
adaptive behavior, and the environment in which choices occur—is 
long overdue. We look forward to this shift in focus and the related 
evidence  and  theories  that  will  unfold  in  the  next  several 
decades.141
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